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CORPORATE ACQUISITION BY TENDER OFFER *
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&
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The technique of acquiring control of a corporation by making
a public offer to purchase a part of the corporation's stock at a fixed
price-usually in cash and representing a premium above market-has
been widely used in the United States in recent years. In 1965 there
were twenty-nine cash tender offers to acquire control involving com-
panies listed on the New York Stock Exchange and fifteen involving
companies listed on the American Stock Exchange. In 1960 there
were only eight such offers involving companies listed on both such
exchanges.' The Investment Dealer's Digest reported thirty-two cash
tender offers for the first six months of 1966.2 The increasing use of
tender offers coincides with a period in which combinations of
American businesses have been prevalent. These combinations are
accomplished through merger, consolidation or acquisition of assets
for stock or cash.3 Tender offers are another technique for creating
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combinations. The corporation making the tender offer usually seeks
to acquire working control through its purchases: it is not content with
being an investor in the offeree company. In many cases, a merger
proposal follows the successful completion of the tender offer.
Although contested tender offers capture the imagination of the
public, tender offers are usually made only after th company making
the offer feels confident that management of the offeree company will
endorse the tender offer or at least will not actively oppose it. Stilling
potential opposition to a tender offer is vital not only because it removes
the major obstacle to the ultimate success of the tender offer, but also
because it usually permits the tender offer to be effected at a lower
price per share.4
In noncontested situations the tender offer may be a less expensive
alternative to a conventional form of acquisition. In the latter
situation the acquiring company must pay, either in cash or stock,
for all the assets of the acquired company. The tender offer technique
permits'the acquiring company to gain control by purchasing a much
smaller portion of the acquired company.5 A merger can still be
effected later if it seems desirable. There are other reasons for pre-
ferring a tender offer as an acquisition technique. Management which
may be neutral to a tender offer would not necessarily be willing to
recommend a merger or sale of assets. In addition, shareholder
approval of these transactions will ordinarily be required.' The need
for shareholder approval raises the necessity of providing the detailed
information required by the Securities and Exchange Commission's
4 The defensive tactics of the management of First National Stores, Inc. forced
Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., which sought the tender of 500,000 shares, to raise the tender
price from $35 to $38. Even under these circumstances, the tender offer was not suc-
cessful. N.Y. Post, July 8, 1966, p. 54, cols. 1-3.
A controlling shareholder who has agreed to sell his control block at a premium
above the market price may insist that a tender offer be made to all the shareholders
at the same price, in order to avoid the possible legal problems that may arise from
the sale of control at a premium. See Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44
CALIF. L. REv. 1, 31 (1956).
s Typically an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the shares entitled to vote is
required. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr § 67 (1960). Further, shareholders
who dissent from the merger are entitled to demand that the corporation pay them
the fair value of their shares. Id. § 74. The shareholders of both companies involved
usually have this right. In New York, shareholders in the surviving corporation only
have appraisal rights in limited circumstances. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 910 (a) (1)
(A) (ii).
A sale of assets may also require a two-thirds vote, but in some jurisdictions only
a majority vote is necessary. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 72, 2.02(d)
(1960). In many jurisdictions, appraisal rights are not available to the shareholders
of the company selling its assets and are usually not available to the shareholders of
the buying company. Id. § 73, 1 2.02(2) (b).
Under certain circumstances, a sale of assets may be regarded as a merger. For
a discussion of some of the problems in this area, see HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAw
AND PRAcricE § 362 (Supp. 1966) ; Folk, De Facto Mergers in Delaware: Hariton v.
Arco Electronics, Inc., 49 VA. L. REv. 1261 (1963).
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proxy rules. 7  Further, effectuation of the merger or sale of assets
often requires extensive and expensive legal documentation.' It also
seems that the tender offer technique of acquiring shares is less vulner-
able than acquisition by merger or purchase of assets to judicial
questioning with respect to the fairness of the price paid. In a tender
offer, each shareholder individually makes his own decision whether
or not to sell his shares and thus, assuming adequate disclosure, no one
has standing to complain about the terms of the offer.9 . Certain of the
advantages of using the tender offer technique of acquisition may be
dissipated if a merger is subsequently effected.1"
Use of the tender offer as an alternative to merger or acquisition
of assets has its costs. The company making the tender offer often is
not able to make the detailed investigation which can be made in
connection with these transactions. In addition, it does not have the
protection of the representations and warranties made in the agreement
of merger or for sale of assets. The acquiring corporation also fre-
quently pays more for each share of stock in the block it acquires than
it would pay for each share if it were buying all the shares. In part,
this increased price reflects the need to offer a premium above market
to induce each shareholder to sell his stock. 1 In part, it reflects the
taxable nature of the cash tender offer transaction. Moreover, if a
merger is subsequently proposed, the price paid in the tender offer
often sets the minimum value of the shares to be issued by the acquiring
corporation in the merger. Finally, unlike the merger or asset
acquisition situation, the offeror will own a company in which there
are minority interests. An arm's-length relationship with the controlled
company must accordingly be observed to avoid problems.'
7 SEC Reg. 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14 (1964). See note 49 infra for a description
of the companies subject to the proxy rules.
8 United Fruit Company abandoned a plan to buy the assets of Winchell Donut
House, Inc., because of its concern that Winchell's many leases would have to be
renegotiated. This problem was apparently solved by United Fruit's making a tender
offer for Winchell shares. Wall Street Journal, Sept 13, 1966, p. 15, col. 4. How-
ever, later the tender offer was called off. N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1966, p. 64, col. 8.
For a discussion of some remedies which may be available in the absence of full
disclosure, see pts. IV & V infra.
10 If the offeror corporation acquires sufficient stock in the offeree company to
effect a short-form merger, some of the complexities and disadvantages of a merger
transaction can be avoided. A typical short-form merger provision is contained in
ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. Corp. Acr § 68A (1960). For a discussion of the short-form
merger, see Comment The Short Merger Statute, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 596 (1965).
l Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64 CoLum. L. RZv. 1427,
1434-36 (1964).
12 See Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., CCH FiE. SEc. L. REP. ff 91,829
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 1966) (suit by minority shareholders of S. H. Kress & Company
against Genesco, which had acquired 94.6% of Kress stock, alleging that Genesco
ran Kress for its own benefit and in disregard of the rights of minority shareholders).
Tax disadvantages may also arise from the use of the tender offer as an acquisi-
tion technique. If the acquiring company secures less than 807 of the stock of the
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If management opposes a conventional form of acquisition, a
tender offer may be the only way to effect it.' A merger or sale of
the corporation's assets requires the affirmative approval of manage-
ment. Proxy contests are the only other alternative to replacing
management as a prelude to achieving the desired combination.
They can be enormously expensive 14 and are usually unsuccess-
acquired company for cash, then later causes the acquired company to merge into it,
a significant amount of "stepped-up basis" available for, say, depreciation or depletion
deductions is lost. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 334(b) (2). This would not be the case
if the assets of the acquired company had been purchased for cash.
A subsequent combination of a company whose shares are acquired in a cash
tender offer with the acquiring company presents other problems under the Internal
Revenue Code. For example, a stock-for-stock exchange after a cash tender offer
will only qualify as a tax-free reorganization if the cash purchases and the subse-
quent stock exchanges are not "integrated." If integrated and viewed as one transaction,
the offer would not be "solely for voting stock," as required by § 368(a) (1) (B).
Furthermore, after completion of the cash tender offer, the offeror cannot acquire the
remaining assets of the offeree by an exchange for its stock. See Rev. Rut. 396, 1954-2
Cum. BULL. 127. The impact of Rev. Rul. 396 can usually be avoided by having a sub-
sidiary of the acquiring company issue stock of its parent in exchange for the assets.
Rev. Rul. 278,1957-1 Cum. BULL. 124; BrrTER & EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 566-68 (2d ed. 1966). It is understood that the
Service will not view this technique favorably if the cash tender offer and the asset
acquisition are integrated. See De Kosmian, Minimizing Number of Shares To Be
Issued in Tax-Free Reorganization; Including Contingent Pay-outs, Use of "Boot,"
and Use of § 306 Stock 3-4, in TAX ASPECTS OF AcQuIoxs AND DIsposTIONS OF
BUSINESSES (P.L.I. ed. 1966).
A merger of the offeror and offeree corporations will constitute a tax-free re-
organization-under § 368(a) (1) (A)--even if the cash tender offer and merger are
viewed as one transaction, provided that the shareholders of the offeror are viewed
as having a sufficient "continuity of interest" in the offeree. The Service has recently
indicated that it will issue a favorable ruling if the value of the stock issued in the
merger by the offeror is equal to 50%5 of the total consideration given by the offeror
in the acquisition. See Rev. Rul. 6&224, 1966 INT. Rzv. BULL. No. 34, at 15. Early
cases permitted as much as 60% of the consideration given to be paid in cash. See,
e.g., John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374 (1935). Thus, the offeror may
acquire at least half of the outstanding stock for cash in a tender and still secure a
favorable ruling on the issuance of stock to shareholders of the offeree company in a
subsequent merger. See MacLean, "Creeping Acquisitions", 21 TAX L. REV. 345
(1966).
Where a successful tender offer is followed by a merger, the transaction can be
treated for accounting purposes as in part a "pooling of interest" and in part a "pur-
chase." Cf. Proxy Statement, Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. and The New Jersey
Zinc Company, Dec. 27, 1965 (relating to merger of New Jersey Zinc into Gulf &
Western-acquisition accounted for as purchase to the extent of 57.5% and as a pooling
of interest to the extent of 42.5%). Presumably, if the shares acquired by purchase
are substantially in excess of those acquired by merger, the entire transaction may
be viewed as a purchase. See generally AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ACCOUNTANTS,
BUSINESS COMBINATIONS (Accounting Research Bull. No. 48, 1957). See also WYATT,
A CRITICAL STUDY OF ACCOUNTING FOR BUSINESS COMBINATIONS 98-102 (American
Institute of Accountants, Accounting Research Study No. 5, 1963).
For an outline comparing the advantages of proceeding by tender offer with
proceeding by other acquisition techniques, see Schmults, Forms of Transactions, in
BUYING, SELLING AND MERGING BUSINESSES 47 (P.L.I. ed. 1966). See also Stark,
Non-Income Tax Aspects of Corporate Reorganizations: A Check List of the Issues
and Problems Involved, N.Y.U. 24TI INST. ON FED. TAX 1085 (1966).
Is A tender offer may also be used as a way of competing with a merger being
negotiated by management Cf. N.Y. World Journal Tribune, Oct. 26, 1966, p. 25,
col. 5 (tender offer for stock of The Belmont Iron Works while management was
negotiating sale of the corporation's assets to Tower Industrial Corporation).
14 The battle for control of Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corporation cost the
insurgents $127,000. However, the insurgents in that case were successful and the
shareholders voted to reimburse them for their expenses. Rosenfeld v. Fairchild
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ful.'5 By contrast the tender offer technique is simpler in its business
and legal mechanics and cheaper. The major expense is the price of the
shares bought. If the maker of the tender offer is correct in its belief
that the shares which it seeks to acquire are depressed, it can view the
purchase price as a reasonable investment. Indeed, if its bid for control
fails, it may frequently be able to sell any shares acquired in the open
market at a profit ' 6 or management may be happy to cause this "dis-
ruptive influence in the corporation" to be bought out-sometimes with
the corporate funds, sometimes with its own or its associates' funds.",
Experience with tender offers has educated managements in the
techniques of defending against this threat to their control. Manage-
ment is not simply a disgruntled shareholder attempting to upset a
merger; it has the resources of the corporation at its disposal to
defend what it will characterize as existing corporate policy.' It can
communicate its opposition to the shareholders by letter or advertise-
ment. Since it possesses the shareholder list, it knows which share-
holders hold large blocks of stock and should be wooed individually. 9
Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955). The insurgents in
the contest for control of Montgomery Ward were not so lucky. They spent roughly
$500,000 in an unsuccessful attempt to unseat management. Their expenses were not
reimbursed. However, their investment in the stock of Montgomery Ward appreci-
ated by roughly $1,000,000. See Nation's Business, July 1955, p. 32. See also Phillips
v. United Corp., Civ. No. 40-497, S.D.N.Y., May 26, 1948, appeal dismissed, 171 F.2d
180 (2d Cir. 1948) (unsuccessful insurgent's claim for reimbursement of $13,000
expended in proxy contest denied).
15 A study of the fifty-six proxy contests for control occurring during the calendar
years 1956-60 reported that only fourteen were successful. In ten other contests the
insurgents obtained some representation on the board of directors through cumulative
voting. See AUSTIN, PROXY CONTESTS AND CORPORATE REFORm 53-54 (1965).
16 If the tender offer is unsuccessful and the offeror decides to sell the shares it
owns, it may have to defer selling until the impact of the tender offer on the market
price has dissipated. See SEC Rules lOb-5, -6, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5, -6 (1964).
Moreover, if during the course of his program of acquiring shares of the offeree com-
pany the offeror becomes the holder of more than 10% of any class of the offeree's
stock, he will be subject to the recapture provisions of § 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. 48 Stat. 896, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964). For a discussion
of liabilities under this section, see 2 Loss, SEcuRrrIES REGULATION 1058-82 (2d ed.
1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
17 See Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964).
18 If management frames the problem in these terms it will usually be accorded
access to the corporate treasury for the purpose of opposing the tender offer. A court
will only bar management from using corporate assets if it believes that the sole issue
at stake is retention by management of its position. See text accompanying notes
192-96 infra.
For a fascinating study of a battle for control of an English company, see Gower,
Corporate Control: The Battle for the Berkeley, 68 Hitv. L. REv. 1176 (1955).
19 If the offeror wishes to examine the stockholders' list, he must, in many juris-
dictions, demonstrate, among other things, a proper purpose. See ABA-ALI MODEL
Bus. CoRP. Acv § 46 (1960). This burden is normally met where the purpose is to
enable the requesting stockholder to make an offer to purchase stock of the company.
See, e.g., E. L. Bruce Co. v. State ex rel. Gilbert, 51 Del. 252, 144 A.2d 533 (1958);
Crouse v. Rogers Park Apartments, Inc., 343 Ill. App. 319, 99 N.E.2d 404 (1951);
State ex rel. G. M. Gustafson Co. v. Crookston Trust Co., 222 Minn. 17, 22 N.W.2d
911 (1946). Compare American Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Miller, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
91,448 (Baltimore City Super. Ct 1964) (denial of inspection where Securities Act
of 1933 registration statement relating to shares proposed to be exchanged in tender
was allegedly false and misleading).
1967]
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It may have strong allies-banks with which the corporation keeps
deposits, insurance companies with which it places business, suppliers
and customers. The banks might withhold financing needed by the
offeror. The other allies might buy stock in the market and thus
push up the price. Any of them might be helpful in keeping stock from
being tendered. 0 The corporation itself might buy some stock 2 or
raise its dividend 2 3-both of which may have the effect of increasing
the price of the stock. Other techniques used to defend against tender
offers include attempts to arrange mergers with other companies, 3 or
attempts to block the acquisition on the ground that it would violate
the antitrust laws 24 or some other regulatory statute.
25
20 The purchase of Louisiana Gas Service Company stock by interests friendly
to it helped defeat a tender offer by Dorchester Gas Producing Company. Wall
Street Journal, Feb. 11, 1966, p. 1, col. 1, p. 8, col. 4.21 American Steel & Pump Corporation made a tender offer for 519 of the stock
of Standard Products Company at $13.50 per share. Standard immediately called a
special stockholders' meeting to approve a repurchase of its own stock at a higher
price. American in turn raised its tender price to $15 per share. The Standard
shareholders then authorized the company to repurchase its shares at $17.25 and
American abandoned its offer. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 11, 1966, p. 1, col. 1.
22After a tender offer by Allied Products for 854,000 shares of Dayco Corpo-
ration at $26 per share, the management of Dayco authorized a five-for-four stock split
and increased the dividend from $.125 on the old shares to $.40 on the new shares.
As a result, the market price for the Dayco stock rose above $26, and Allied abandoned
its offer. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1966, p. 53, col. 6, p. 55, col. 3.
Recently, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer indicated that one of the two
cases in which a company would be exempted from the freeze on dividends was where
an increased dividend might be necessary to resist a tender offer for control. The
Financial Times, Oct. 5, 1966, p. 13, col. 3.
2 3 When Sun Chemical made a tender offer for stock of Harshaw Chemical
Company, Harshaw management stated that it had a proposal for a tax-free exchange
with a "substantial industrial company." N.Y. Times, July 28, 1966, p. 42, col. 2.
24 See, e.g., Muskegon Piston Ring Co. v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 328 F.2d
830 (6th Cir. 1964) (complaint alleging stock acquired in violation of Clayton Act).
25 When Pennzoil Company made its successful tender offer for shares of United
Gas Corporation, United sought to enjoin Pennzoil from acquiring more than 10%
of the voting stock of United or, at least, from voting such stock. United claimed
that, if the Pennzoil acquisition were effected, it would create a public utility holding
company structure. United claimed that its corporate structure would have to be
revised to comply with the provisions of the Public Utility Holding Company Act,
and that it would also have to divest itself of certain subsidiaries--all to the detriment
of its shareholders. The court denied the injunction. It stated:
An established corporate structure is not immune from change by legal
means. If corporate stock is available for purchase it can be expected that
there will be change of stock ownership and, indeed, change of control. The
mere fact that the changed circumstances brought about by a change of stock
ownership will subject a corporation to federal regulation does not restrict
another corporation from exercising its legal rights to make a legitimate
stock purchase.
United Gas Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 248 F. Supp. 449, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd per
curium, 354 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1966).
The complaint in Columbia Pictures Corp. v. Clairmont, Civil No. 3581, S.D.N.Y.,
1966, alleges that purchase of Columbia Pictures Corporation stock in a tender offer
violated the Federal Communications Act.
The SEC has ordered a hearing to determine whether the proposed acquisition
of shares of Michigan Gas and Electric Company by American Electric Power Com-
pany or Michigan Gas Utilities Company, its assignee, violates the Public Utility
Holding Company Act. See American Elec. Power Co., SEC Holding Co. Act
Release No. 15,492 (June 2, 1966).
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Although management opposition may not be successful, it may,
as previously pointed out, force an increase in the tender offer price.
26
In addition, the contest period may produce uncertainty among the
employees, suppliers and customers of the company to be acquired and
thus damage its business. Furthermore, the tender offer, unlike most
acquisition negotiations, is public. If the offer is not successful, it may
be embarrassing to the offeror. Finally, other parties may be induced
to compete for the corporation through a rival tender offer or merger
proposal.2
The rapidly increasing use of tender offers as an acquisition tech-
nique and the virulence of some of the battles surrounding them has
created concern about this method of effecting transfers of corporate
control. Substantially identical bills to regulate tender offers have
been introduced in the United States Senate and the House of Repre-
sentatives.2" The Securities and Exchange Commission has sub-
mitted comments on this bill and proposed a substitute measure.
Concern has not been confined to the United States. Australia, the
Canadian Province of Ontario and Great Britain have studied the
problem and devised legislative solutions0 °
26 See text accompanying notes 4, 21-22 supra; see also text accompanying notes
191, 205 infra.
27 Recent events involving Kendall Refining Company vividly illustrate this point
On January 27, 1966, Kewanee Oil Company made a tender offer for any and all
outstanding shares of Kendall Refining at $52.50 per share. On January 31, 1966,
Kendall and Witco Chemical Company agreed to a merger in which each Kendall
share would be exchanged for Witco cumulative convertible preferred stock. On
February 2, 1966, Kewanee offered $55.50 per share for at least 180,000 shares of
Kendall. Witco countered by improving the conversion and dividend rates and redemp-
tion terms on the convertible preferred it was offering in the merger. On February 22,
1966, Kewanee made a final offer of $65 per share. Witco again increased the con-
version and dividend rates on the convertible preferred. Witco's merger proposal
was accepted by the Kendall shareholders.
28 S. 2731, H.R. 14417, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). Neither bill was acted on
by the Eighty-ninth Congress. Senator Williams, the sponsor of S. 2731, indicated
that he will reintroduce the bill, with some changes, in the early days of the Ninetieth
Congress. N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1966, p. 45, col. 7, p. 51, col. 3.
29SEC, Memorandum to the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on
S. 2731, 89th Cong. (1966) [hereinafter cited as SEC Memorandum on S. 2731].
30 Australia: Companies Act, Act No. 71 of 1961, § 184, Tenth Schedule [herein-
after cited as Australia Companies Act]. The Australian legislation is directed at a
bid for control of one corporation by or on behalf of another corporation. Id. § 184(1).
For a discussion of the Australian legislation, see Shtein, Some Legal Aspects of
Company Takeovers in Australia, 5 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 47 (1965).
Ontario: The Securities Act, 1966, Bill 66, 27th Leg., 4th Sess. pt. IX [herein-
after cited as Ontario Securities Act]. Although passed by the appropriate legislative
bodies, this act will not be effective until it is proclaimed by the appropriate executive
official. The Ontario legislation is discussed in Report of the Attorney General's
Committee on Securities Regulation in Ontario (1965) [hereinafter cited as the
Kimber Report].
Great Britain: Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 45,
§ 14; Licensed Dealers (Conduct of Business) Rules, 1960, First Schedule, pt. II,
Third Schedule [hereinafter cited as British Dealers Rules]. Recommendations for
additional legislation in Great Britain are contained in Company Law Committee,
Report, Cm. No. 1749, 294 (1962) [hereinafter cited as the Jenkins Report]. The
19671
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Criticism of the tender offer technique has developed along two
lines. One line directly attacks the desirability of permitting transfers
of control to be accomplished by this route. Critics who follow this line
usually characterize the makers of tender offers as corporate raiders
who are set upon liquidating the companies over which they seek
control. Senator Harrison Williams analyzed the problem in this
way when he introduced S. 2731 in the Senate:
In recent years we have seen proud old companies re-
duced to corporate shells after white-collar pirates have seized
control with funds from sources which are unknown in many
cases, then sold or traded away the best assets, later to split up
most of the loot among themselves ....
The ultimate responsibility for preventing this kind of
industrial sabotage lies with the management and the share-
holders of the corporation that is so threatened. But the
leniency of our laws places management and shareholders at
a distinct disadvantage in coming to grips with the enemy."1
British criticism focused on the "speculative element" involved in the
tender offer procedure. This criticism blended with a feeling that
such offers are "just not done by the best people." 32
This line of criticism has itself been severely attacked.38 The
report of the Attorney General's Committee on Securities Legislation
Licensed Dealers (Conduct of Business) Rules statutorily apply only to a limited
number of transactions-those effected by a small group called licensed dealers.
Tender offers effected by members of a recognized stock exchange are exempt from
the Rules. However, the stock exchanges and other exempted dealers broadly comply
with the provisions of the Rules in connection with the issuance of circulars containing
tender offers. Jenkins Report It 269. The British experience with respect to tender
offers is most fully described in WEINBER, TAmE-OVERS AND AMALGAMATIONS (1963).
Other countries have also adopted rules governing tender offers. See Cohen, supra
note 1, at 152.
81 Ill Cong. Rec. 27348-49 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1965). A management official of
Julius Garfinckel & Company commented on a tender offer for its shares by Genesco,
Inc. as follows:
This type of maneuver, which has been rampant in England, is, in my
opinion, a wholly unfair and even an un-American approach. It involves no
sacrifice for the purchaser because he can take or leave what is tendered.
But, if he gets enough, working behind the backs of the management, he has
succeeded without exercising any risk.
N.Y. Times, March 30, 1966, p. 57, col. 1. See N.Y. World Journal Tribune, Oct.
31, 1966, p. 16 (describing tender offer for Columbia Pictures Corporation as a
"raid").
82 Penrose, Some Aspects of the Take-Over Bid, 9 JuImD. Rmv. 146, 148 (1964)
(quoting the Glasgow Herald, Feb. 11, 1954).
a3 Of course, there is nothing illegal per se about a purchase of control of a
corporation. For example, in Fenestra Inc. v. Gulf Am. Land Corp., 377 Mich. 565,
608, 141 N.W.2d 36, 55-56 (1966), the court observed:
It is one of the risks of publicly-held corporations that a total stranger
may purchase a controlling interest in a particular corporation. If the pur-
chase is not unlawful, the courts may not superimpose their suspicions, pre-
dilections, and judgments upon the actions of the entrepreneur.
See also Studebaker Corp v. Allied Prods. Corp., 256 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
In Robotham v. Prudential Ins. Co., 64 N.J. Eq. 673, 678, 53 Atl. 842, 844 (Ch. 1903),
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in Ontario concluded that take-over bids, in many cases, offer positive
advantages to the companies involved, their shareholders and the
economy in general.34 These benefits include assuring competitive
efficiency among corporate managers, increasing management account-
ability to its shareholders and affording the shareholders an oppor-
tunity to secure a premium for their shares. Logically, tender offers
should be made for the shares of corporations whose rates of return
on net worth or profit margins are low relative to their industry
grouping3 5 These deficiencies will be reflected in the market price for
a company's stock and accordingly present an opportunity for a sig-
nificant profit to the offeror if the company can be revitalized and run
more efficiently."8 Moreover, as Professor Henry Manne has stated:
But the greater benefits of the take-over scheme prob-
ably inure to those least conscious of it. Apart from the
stock market, we have no objective standard of managerial
efficiency. Courts, as indicated by the so-called business-
judgment rule, are loath to second-guess business decisions
or remove directors from office. Only the take-over scheme
provides some assurance of competitive efficiency among cor-
porate managers and thereby affords strong protection to the
interests of vast numbers of small, non-controlling stock-
holders.
7
the directors of Prudential sought to put the company "forever beyond the reach of
reckless speculators, who . . . might acquire [stock] even at fancy prices, for the
purpose of manipulating its assets" by having Fidelity Trust Company purchase a
controlling interest in Prudential and then having Prudential purchase a controlling
interest in Fidelity. The court enjoined this scheme to perpetuate the control of
incumbent management. Compare the attitude of the Second Circuit in Studebaker
Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692, 695 (2d Cir. 1966), in which the court noted that one
of the purposes of the proxy rules was to provide protection from "irresponsible
outsiders seeking to wrest control of a corporation away from honest and conscientious
corporate officials."
3 4 Kimber Report 20.
35A recent study reached similar conclusions concerning the companies which
made the most inviting and successful target for proxy contests. Duval & Austin,
Predicting the Results of Proxy Contests, 20 J. FINANCE 464 (1965). Other factors
which invite attempts to take over control include accumulation of substantial amounts
of cash and existence of undervalued assets. Further, the company may fit into the
diversification plans of the company attempting the take-over. Poor stockholder rela-
tions may also indicate that a bid for control can be successful. See Barnhill, The
Corporate Raider; Contesting Proxy Solicitations and Take Over Offers, 20 Bus.
LAw. 763, 764-65 (1965).
A recent analysis of the proxy fights and take-over attempts in the movie industry
indicates that the primary causes are the thin capitalization of most movie companies,
the relatively small size of management holdings and the upsurge in prices television
networks are paying for movies. Glenn, Reaching for the Stars, Barron's, Oct 24,
1966, p. 5.
3 6 See Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. EcoN.
110, 112-13 (1965). See also Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting,
64 CoLJ m. L. Rv. 1427, 1434-37 (1964).
3 7 Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. PoL. EcoN. 110,
113 (1965). See also AusTwN, op. cit. supra note 15, at 46-47.
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Although none of the enacted or proposed legislation outlaws
tender offers, some of it demonstrates a fundamental lack of sympathy
for this device. The hallmark of such legislation is a provision which
requires notice to be given to management well in advance of the
making of the tender offer. The Williams Bill requires twenty days'
notice." The Australia Companies Act requires fourteen to twenty-
eight days' notice.3" The British Licensed Dealers (Conduct of Busi-
ness) Rules require three business days' notice to the offeree company."
Such advance warning gives management time to marshal its re-
sources against the tender offer. As indicated earlier, management
has many inherent advantages over any outsider seeking to oust it
from control and it is generally believed that secrecy until publication
of the offer is a prerequisite to its success.4 '
The second level of attack on tender offers focuses on specific
aspects of the technique used. The major complaint has been that
the offeree shareholder does not receive sufficient information to
enable him to make an informed decision about the desirability of
selling his stock. All the enacted and proposed legislation seeks to
provide for a minimal amount of disclosure. The Ontario Securities
Act requires a summary of the volume of trading and price range of
the offeree company's shares in the six-months period prior to the
making of the offer, a description of any arrangements made with the
management of the offeree company and any information known to
the offeror which indicates a material change in the financial position
or prospects of the offeree company since the date of the last published
financial statements of the offeree company." The Australian and
British legislation are similar.43 In addition, the Australian legis-
38 S. 2731, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10(c) (1) (1965) [hereinafter cited as S. 2731].
The SEC's redraft of the Williams Bill eliminates this provision. The SEC proposal
requires a statement containing specified information to be filed with it (for its infor-
mation only) five days before the tender offer is made. SEC Memorandum on S.
2731, § 14(d) (1).
39 Australia Companies Act § 184(2) (a).
4 0 British Dealers Rules § 1(d) (ii). The Jenkins Report appeared to endorse
this requirement. Jenkins Report 1 274. The Kimber Report rejected any notice
requirement because notice "would hinder the success of a potential bid . . . and
indeed, in some cases, would virtually ensure its failure." Kimber Report 24.
41 For a description of the elaborate security precautions taken by Pennzoil
Company prior to its tender offer for United Gas Corporation, see Wall Street Journal,
Feb. 11, 1966, p. 8, col. 4.
42 Ontario Securities Act §§ 90.7-.9.
43 Australia Companies Act, Tenth Schedule, pt. C, 1112(d)-(g); British Dealers
Rules, First Schedule, pts. I, II, 2(6)-(8).
Although the Williams Bill and the Commission proposal do not specifically call
for any of these items of information, both of these legislative proposals contemplate
the issuance of Commission rules to define areas of material information which the
maker of a tender offer can reasonably be expected to provide. S. 2731, § 10(c) (1) ;
SEC Memorandum on S. 2731, § 13(d) (1) (A). It is possible that the information
called for by the Commonwealth legislation will serve as a model for such rules. See
text accompanying notes 118-23 infra.
ACQUISITION BY TENDER OFFER
lation requires the offeree company to supply certain information,
including any material changes in the financial condition of the
company since the date of the balance sheet used in the annual report.44
The Williams Bill and the SEC proposal require that a tender offer
looking toward control or representation on the board of directors of
the offeree corporation disclose any plans of the offeror with respect
to the continuation of the business of the offeree company.45
Legislation and legislative proposals have gone beyond disclosure
to deal with certain aspects of tender offer techniques which are con-
sidered unfair to shareholders. In large part, regulation in this area
is designed to relieve shareholders from the need to act before they
have had a chance to weigh opposing arguments 46 with respect to the
wisdom of selling their shares and to prevent them from being locked
into an offer for too long a period of time.4 7  The SEC's proposal and
the Ontario legislation provide that where the terms of a tender offer
are changed to provide increased consideration for shares purchased,
the increased consideration shall be paid for all shares bought under
the tender offer, including those tendered prior to the change in the
terms of the tender offer.
48
44 Australia Companies Act § 184(3), Tenth Schedule, pt C, 2(h).
45 S. 2731, § 10(c) (1) (iii); SEC Memorandum on S. 2731, § 13(d) (1) (A) (iii).
The proposed American legislation and the Commonwealth legislation also call for
information about the security holdings of the tender offeror, S. 2731, §§ 10(c)(1)
(iv)-(vii); SEC Memorandum on S. 2731, §§ 13(d) (1) (A) (iv)-(v); Australia
Companies Act, Tenth Schedule, pt. B, f 1(c) ; British Dealers Rules, First Schedule,
pt. II, 2(1) ; Ontario Securities Act § 90(1), the identity of the off eror (not required
by the Ontario legislation), S. 2731, § 10 (c) (1) (i) ; SEC Memorandum on S. 2731,
§ 13(d) (1) (A) (i) ; Australia Companies Act, Tenth Schedule, pt. B, [4(d) ; British
Dealers Rules, First Schedule, pt. II, 12(1), (9), and information about arrange-
ments made for ensuring payment by the offeror. S. 2731, § 10(c) (1) (ii); SEC
Memorandum on S. 2731, § 13(d) (1) (A) (ii); Australia Companies Act, Tenth
Schedule, pt. B, 113; British Dealers Rules, First Schedule, pt. II, 12(5); Ontario
Securities Act § 90(6).
46 Or competing bids for their shares.
47 The SEC proposal requires that where a tender offer is made for less than all
the shares and more securities are deposited than called for by the offer, the shares
will be taken up on a pro rata basis rather than on a first-come, first-served basis.
SEC Memorandum on S. 2731, § 14(d) (4). Similar provisions appear in the British
and Ontario legislation. British Dealers Rules, First Schedule, pt. II, 1 1(4); On-
tario Securities Act § 81(7). The Australian legislation does not specifically require
that tender offers be made on a pro rata basis. However, it does require (1) that, un-
less withdrawn for all shares, any offer made must be kept open for at least one month,
Australia Companies Act, Tenth Schedule, pt A, 1f 1, and (2) that if any offer is
conditioned upon a minimum number of acceptances, the offer must specify the latest
date on which the offeror can declare the offer "to have become free from that
condition" and give an additional seven days for acceptance to be made. Id., Tenth
Schedule, pt. A, ff 4. The Commission's proposal also requires that a deposit may be
withdrawn during the first seven days of the offer and at any time after sixty days
from the date of the original offer. SEC Memorandum on S. 2731, § 14(d) (3).
This provision appears to be modeled on the Ontario legislation. Ontario Securities
Act §§ 81(2), (3), (5). For a more detailed discussion of these types of provisions,
see pt. III infra.
48 SEC Memorandum on S. 2731, § 14(d) (5); Ontario Securities Act § 83(1).
Neither the Australian nor the British legislation contains such a provision. For
further discussion of the problems involved in varying the terms of tender offers,
see text accompanying notes 100-09 infra.
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Although specific provisions of the proposed American legislation
and the Commonwealth legislation will be discussed during the course
of this article, our primary focus will be on the legal framework
governing the making of tender offers as it exists and as it is develop-
ing under present law.
The prototype case which will serve as a basis of our discussion
assumes that Corporation A, whose common stock is listed on the
New York Stock Exchange, seeks to acquire 51 7. of the outstanding
shares of common stock of Corporation B. The B shares, which are
listed on the American Stock Exchange,4" have been trading in the
last two months at a price between $18 and $20 per share. A intends to
purchase as much B stock as possible on the American Stock Exchange
and to purchase one large block of B stock from a mutual fund which,
A understands, wishes to dispose of its holdings in B. After accumula-
tion of a block of B shares in this manner, A intends to make a public
offer for tenders of B stock at $25 per share. A presently owns no
B shares and has no directors or officers in common with B.
If A pursues its plan for acquiring 51% of the shares of B, it is
likely that those persons who sell their shares to A early in its acquisi-
tion program will receive less for their shares than those who sell
their shares later-particularly those who sell their shares pursuant to
A's tender offer. Does present law try to benefit these early sellers by
imposing on A an affirmative duty to disclose its plans, including its
willingness to pay a price above market for a substantial block of
B stock? " If such a duty exists it will probably be found in that part
49 As is the case with any listed company, B's shares would be registered under
§ 12(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 48 Stat. 892, as amended, 15
U.S.C. §781(b) (1964). If B were an over-the-counter company with over
$1,000,000 in total assets and with a class of stock held by 500 or more stockholders
of record, that stock would be registered under the Exchange Act. Section 12(g),
78 Stat. 566 (1964), 15 U.S.C. §781(g) (1964). When it registers its securities,
a company must file an application for registration containing detailed financial and
business information. Section 13 requires a registered company to file annual and
periodic reports. 48 Stat. 894 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1964). Regis-
tered companies are also subject to the proxy rules, issued under § 14, 48 Stat. 895
(1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1964), and their officers, directors and any
holders of more than 107 of the registered stock are subject to the insider trading
provisions of § 16. 48 Stat. 896 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1964).
5o As indicated earlier, the Commission's suggested amendments to S. 2731 con-
tain a provision that where the terms of a tender offer are changed to increase the
consideration paid for shares tendered, shares which had been tendered prior to the
announced increase must receive the higher consideration. SEC Memorandum on
S. 2731, § 14(d) (5). According to the Commission this provision would "avoid the
discriminatory effect of paying some holders more than others." Id. at 20. The
Commission's recommendation does not extend to shares purchased in the market
prior to the making of the tender offer.
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of Rule 1Ob-5 issued by the Commission under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 which prohibits any person from engaging in "any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security." "1 Although most of the cases arising under
Rule lOb-5 involve an alleged misrepresentation or half-truth, recent
cases accept the principle that liability may exist in situations involving
total nondisclosure in the anonymity of a transaction on a stock ex-
change or in the organized over-the-counter market." The threshold
problem then involves identification of those situations in which a
purchase or sale by a person triggers a duty for that person to disclose
material information not previously made public. At the outset it
should be clear that there must be both a person having a status re-
quiring him to disclose and a fact that must be disclosed. The type
of fact which triggers responsibilities has been described in various
legal formulae, but appears to involve an event the disclosure of which
will have a significant impact on the market price of a company's
securities.
53
The duty of disclosure appears to arise whenever persons who
control the disclosure policies of a corporation effect a transaction in
the corporation's securities. The federal securities laws try to create
conditions under which investment decisions can be made after con-
sideration of all relevant information. Thus, they have an interest
in having all corporate news disclosed as soon as possible. However,
the decision that an item of corporate news is ripe for publication-
that is, it has been sufficiently checked for accuracy and a determination
has been made that publication will not prejudice any legitimate in-
terest of the corporation-is often a difficult one and normally should
61 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (c) (1964).
52 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ; Cochran
v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (organized over-the-counter
market). Contra, Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933). For
a general discussion of Rule 10b-5, see 3 Loss 1445-74, 1682-1862.
For a provocative discussion of insider trading and a view that such trading
should not be prohibited and is, indeed, beneficial, see MANNE, INsiDER TRADING
AND TKE STOCK MARKET (1966).
53 It is not clear whether the information is material if it may have a sig-
nificant impact on market price without having a significant impact on the intrinsic
value of the stock. The Texas Gulf Sulphur opinion uses both tests. Compare
258 F. Supp. at 280 ("it is information which, if known, would clearly affect 'invest-
ment judgment' . . . or which directly bears on the intrinsic value of a company's
stock"), with id. at 283 ("the results of K-55-1 were too 'remote' . . . to have
had any significant impact on the market [price]"). The difference in result cre-
ated by the use of the two tests is sharply posed in connection with information
concerning a proposed stock dividend. See Hafner v. Forest Labs., Inc., 345 F.2d
167 (2d Cir. 1965). See also Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Informa-
tion Practices: The Implications of the Texas. Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA.
L. REv. 1271, 1288-91 (1965).
1967]
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be left to management. 4 If management's decision in determining
the timing of the disclosure of corporate news is to be conclusive,
management should have no personal interest in delaying disclosure.55
Since A does not control the disclosure policies of B, its purchases of
B stock will not trigger a duty to disclose under this theory.
A broader basis for restricting securities trading while in posses-
sion of material, undisclosed information stems from traditional notions
of fiduciary responsibility as developed under both state and federal
law. The duty of disclosure seeks to prevent a corporate insider from
utilizing his position to take unfair advantage of the uninformed
shareholder.5" The Commission expressed this theory in its opinion
in Cady, Roberts:
Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal ele-
ments; first, the existence of a relationship giving access,
directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available
only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit
of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved where
a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is
unavailable to those with whom he is dealing."
The class of persons on whom this fiduciary responsibility falls has
been labeled "insiders." Although the concept of insider extends be-
yond management to controlling stockholders and employees, no case
has held or suggested that it encompasses a person in A's position.5"
5 There are some limits on management's discretion in determining the timing
of the disclosure of corporate news. For example, if a rumor concerning a corporate
development circulates, management may have to disclose facts about that development
even though it does not desire to do so. If management fails to make such disclosures,
trading in the securities of the corporation may be suspended by the exchange on
which the stock is listed or by the SEC. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(c) (5),
78 Stat 574 (1964), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (5) (1964) ; § 19(a) (4), 48 Stat. 898 (1934),
15 U.S.C. § 78s(a) (4) (1964).
5 See Mundheim, The Texas Gulf Sulphur Complaint: A Major Step in
Restricting Insider Trading in Corporate Securities, 1966 J. Bus. L. 284, 287-89; cf.
Berle, Publicity of Accounts and Directors' Purchases of Stock, 25 MIcH. L. REv.
827, 830-31 (1927).
56 Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951). judge
Leahy said that one of the primary purposes of the Securities Exchange Act was
"to outlaw the use of inside information by corporate officers and principal stock-
holders for their own financial advantage to the detriment of uninformed public
security holders." For state law cases expressing similar concepts, see, e.g., Mans-
field Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 263 F.2d 748, 754 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 885 (1959); Taylor v. Wright, 69 Cal. App. 2d 371, 379-81, 159 P.2d 980,
984-85 (1945). But see Mairs v. Madden, 307 Mass. 378, 30 N.E.2d 242 (1940).
See also HENN, CORPORATIONS §240 (1961), for differing state views on the fidu-
ciary obligations of directors to shareholders with whom they effect securities
transactions.
57 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
58 See Fleischer, supra note 53, at 1280-84; Comment, Insider Liability Under
Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5; The Cady, Roberts Doctrine, 30 U. CHIL
L. REv. 121, 131-47 (1962).
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At any rate the undisclosed information possessed by A was not ob-
tained as a result of a relationship giving access to information to be
used solely for B's purposes.
The Cady, Roberts opinion also talks about the "inherent unfair-
ness" where one party deals with another, knowing that the other does
not have certain material information. Although it can be argued that
the underlying purpose of the securities laws is to promote to the
extent possible an absolute parity of information"' between persons
who trade in the securities markets, no case has attempted to impose
restrictions on securities trading on this basis.' Application of the
fairness approach on a broad scale appears to be an administrative
impossibility. Furthermore, this approach seems so contrary to the
basis on which securities analysis and trading exists that a court should
be reluctant to follow it without some clearer legislative signal. For
example, would any person desiring to acquire a large block of stock
by a series of small purchases have to notify all potential sellers of this
fact? Reluctance to impose a duty of affirmative disclosure appears to
flow naturally from the existing pattern of behavior in a competitive
economy. Our economic system believes it desirable, on the whole, to
reward the diligent who have acquired a superior market position.61
Except under a broad application of the fairness approach, none
of the policies underlying Rule 10b-5 require A in connection with its
purchases on the exchange to disclose its plans to acquire control of
B. A does not have the relationship with B which results in the
imposition of a fiduciary duty.' A's negotiation with the mutual
59 We do not suggest that this argument can be extended to require a person to
make his analysis of the information available to everyone with whom he deals.
Cady, Roberts itself negatives such a suggestion by distinguishing between inside
information and "perceptive analysis of generally known facts." 40 S.E.C. at 915.
However, frequently it is difficult to distinguish between "facts" and "perceptive
analysis of facts." See Comment, The Prospects for Rule X-1OB-5, 59 YALE L.J.
1120, 1148 (1950).
60 The information might relate to the company. Suppose A's president learns
from D, a potential customer of B, that it will place large, profitable orders with B.
Only application of the fairness concept would seem to prevent A from buying B
stock without disclosing this "outside" information. The information might relate,
as it does in our prototype case, not to information about B, but to information about
the trading market in B shares.
61 See Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 725, 742
(1956).
62 See JENNINGS & MARSH, SEcuumnEs REGULATION 836-37 (1963). Compare
M. S. Wien & Co., 23 S.E.C. 735, 746-54 (1946) (violation of Rule 10b-5 by
brokerage firm which purchased bonds from holders where, among other things,
there was a failure to disclose an imminent tender offer by the issuer which was
unexpected in light of the issuer's general financial position).
What if associates of the brokerage firm that is buying the B shares for A
purchase B shares for their own account, knowing of A's prospective offer? For
the reasons set forth in the text, there would appear to be no duty of disclosure to
their sellers. However, such an action would probably constitute a breach of their
fiduciary duty to A. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), AGENCY §§ 393, 395 (1958); cf.
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fund for the purchase of its block of stock should not call for a different
result. Requiring disclosure of A's intentions in the context of a face-
to-face transaction would not, to be sure, present all the problems
which would be raised if disclosure were required in connection with
exchange transactions. On the other hand, there is no compelling
reason for enhancing the bargaining position of the institutional in-
vestor in this case. 3  The information within A's knowledge relates
to its own intentions about its market activities. This is the type of
intelligence that, in a free market context, should only have to be
revealed for the most striking justification."4
Under present law, A would be required to disclose its plans only
if it can, in some manner, be brought within the insider class and then
only under certain circumstances. For example, if prior to the com-
mencement of its proposed market purchases (or during the course
of such purchases) A's management discusses the tender offer with
B's management and learns some material facts about B not yet dis-
closed to the public, A might be regarded with respect to those facts
as a quasi-official of B for purposes of Rule lOb-5 . ' Similarly, if dur-
ing the course of the purchasing program A and B agree to a merger in
which the B shareholders would receive more than the present market
price for their stock, A should cease its market purchases until the
terms of the agreement are disclosed."8
Suppose that during the course of its acquisition program, A
accumulates over 10% of B's common stock. Since a more than 10%
stockholding is normally viewed as the benchmark of an insider for
Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949). The New York
Stock Exchange disciplined a member of a brokerage firm who, upon hearing from
a president of a company that it planned to make a tender offer for its own stock
at a price substantially above market, acquired stock for his wife before the news
was made public. SEC, Special Study of Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 95,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, p. 435 (1963).
63 A will usually attempt to secure the block by having a broker or a Third
Market maker get the stock for him. This technique gives the transaction the
character of an ordinary market transaction. It is unlikely that any questions will
be asked, particularly since there seems to be no duty to disclose A's identity.
64 In a face-to-face transaction, a seller may protect itself by asking appro-
priate questions during the negotiations. If the buyer misrepresents the facts in the
course of the negotiations, the institutional seller would have a cause of action under
Rule 10b-5(2). E.g., Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 879 (1965) (plaintiffs asked defendant, who was president, general manager
and a director of the company, whether he "knew of any material change in the
affairs of the company or in the past months which could cause us to have any dif-
ferent opinion about the company").
65 See Fleischer, supra note 53, at 1284. Significantly, in the Texas Gulf Sulphur
proceeding itself, the SEC did not seek any relief against those persons who had
received the alleged inside information from the Texas Gulf Sulphur management
or employees. The SEC tried to hold the management and employees responsible
for the purchases made by the persons to whom they had given this information.
66 See Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943); .Complaint, SEC
v. Golconda Mining Co., Civil No. 65-1512, S.D.N.Y., May 19, 1965.
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federal securities law purposes,67 must A now discontinue its program
until it discloses its intentions to the other holders of B stock? The
undisclosed information, A's intention to purchase control and its
willingness to pay more than the present market for such control, clearly
did not come to A as a result of its newly acquired inside position.
Thus, under the Cady, Roberts rationale, A's ability to continue its
purchases would not be inhibited. 8
Although knowledge of one's own intentions does not constitute
inside information in the usual case, there are situations in which such
intentions must be disclosed. The classic case involved the purchase
by Transamerica Corporation of stock in Axton-Fisher Corporation,
of which it was the controlling shareholder, without disclosing its
intent to liquidate the corporation and sell Axton-Fisher's tobacco
6
7A more than 10% stockholder is subject to the insider reporting and profit
recapture provisions of § 16 of the Securities Exchange Act. See also Securities Act
of 1933, Schedule A(22), 48 Stat. 88, 15 U.S.C. §77aa(22) (1964). In addition,
various Commission forms require disclosure of the ownership of more than 10%
of a company's outstanding stock. See, e.g., Form S-1, item 19(a), 17 C.F.R.
§239.11 (1964); Form S-8, item 24, 17 C.F.R. §239.16b (1964); Form 10-K,
items 5, 6(d), 17 C.F.R. §249.310 (1964). In the case of a significant stockholder,
the ability to acquire information because of his holdings may make him an "in-
sider." However, in our prototype case, A will try to accumulate B stock in the
market without disclosing its activities or its identity to B management. Thus,
even if A has the ability to acquire information because of the size of its holdings,
it will not try to use that ability. In any event, it is not clear that a person with
access to corporate information solely by reason of his stockholdings is subject to
restrictions with respect to information obtained from noncorporate sources.
68 See Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753, 765 (D.N.J. 1955). In TU.S.
Indus., Inc. v. Beryl, Civil No. 6853, W.D. Wash., Aug. 23, 1966, the plaintiff alleged
that defendants, directors of Sunshine Mining Company, violated § 10(b) by pur-
chasing stock of U.S. Industries at a time when they knew that Sunshine was plan-
ning a tender offer at a higher price.
The open market purchases by A may also raise questions under § 16 of the
Exchange Act as to whether A is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of
more than 10%o of the B stock. A may acquire a "call" on a block of B securities
which, if acquired, would make it a 107 or larger holder of B stock. If the option
is nontransferable, a § 16 report need not be filed. Rule 16(a) (6), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.16(a) (6) (1964). Although a transferable option acquired by a person already
subject to § 16(a) must be reported, it has been suggested that no report must be
filed by a party such as A which is not otherwise subject to § 16(a). See Feldman &
Teberg, Beneficial Ownership Under Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 17 WEs. Res. L. REv. 1054, 1092-95 (1966). A proposed amendment to Rule
16(a) (6) would eliminate any distinction in the reporting of transferable and non-
transferable options. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7794 (Jan. 20, 1966). Ar-
rangements entered into by A with B shareholders prior to making its tender offer
present difficult and unresolved issues as to whether A has an option or other
beneficial interest required to be reported under § 16(a). For example, A may
secure a commitment from holders of more than 10% of the B stock that they will
tender their shares if A makes a tender offer. Does -this create a partnership be-
tween A and the B stockholders? See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a) (9),
48 Stat. 883, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (9) (1964). Does it give A an "option"? If A
is regarded as having beneficial ownership of more than 10% of the B stock, B has
standing to secure an injunction to compel A to file the required report. Chicago,
So. S. & So. E.R.R. v. Monon R.R., CCH FaD. SEc. L, REP. 91,525 (N.D, Ill,
1965).
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inventory. 9 Although the court found that the price paid for the
shares was fair if the corporation continued as a going concern, it
also found that the price was too low if the corporation were to be
liquidated. The court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to full
damages for the losses they sustained by selling at the price offered
by Transamerica. The opinion outlines the duty of a controlling
shareholder in broad terms:
It is unlawful for an insider, such as a majority stock-
holder, to purchase the stock of minority stockholders without
disclosing material facts affecting the value of the stock,
known to the majority stockholder by virtue of his inside
position but not known to the selling minority stockholders,
which information would have affected the judgment of the
sellers. The duty of disclosure stems from the necessity of
preventing a corporate insider from utilizing.his position to
take unfair advantage of the uninformed minority stock-
holders. It is an attempt to provide some degree of equaliza-
tion of bargaining position in order that the minority may
exercise an informed judgment in any such transaction."
The limits of the Speed case can be tested by supposing that B
is a closed-end investment company whose shares are selling at a
significant discount from net asset value. If A can persuade B to
"open-end" (make its shares redeemable at net asset value) or to
liquidate, it would immediately be able to realize a profit on all the
shares it had previously purchased at the discount. We think that
A can purchase B shares in this situation without disclosing its
plans 7"-at least up to the point where A has obtained a consensus
from the board of directors of B that its plan for liquidation will be
proposed to the shareholders and there is at least a "reasonable proba-
bility" of its adoption.' At that point A may be regarded as no
69 Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
70 Id. at 828-29.
7LAn important distinction between the Speed case and the closed-end fund
situation is that in the former only Transanerica knew--and that information was
obtained in part from its designee on the board of directors-that if the company were
liquidated, each share would be worth more than the present market value. This
result is apparent to every investor in a closed-end fund with a significant discount
from net asset.value.
72 Mergers, and similar transactions, seem to be regarded as material facts when
there is a "reasonable probability" of their occurrence. See Quirke v. Norfolk &
W. Ry., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 91,645 (S.D.N.Y. March 14, 1966). A thorough
exploration of the question of materiality appears in Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., CCH
Fan. SEc. L. REP. 191,699 (1st Cir. June 2, 1966). In its amicus brief in that
case, the Commission said:
We disag-ee, however, with any suggestion in the opinion that when there
are serious negotiations being carried on by the corporation which might
significantly increase the market value of its stock, the corporation is free
to purchase the stock without disclosure of such negotiations.
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longer taking any significant risk with respect to the effectuation of
its plan in purchasing more shares, and the additional profit it would
obtain from doing so without informing the B shareholders is difficult
to justify as serving any economic purpose.
73
If management decides to propose open-ending or liquidation to
the shareholders of a closed-end fund, they may not purchase shares
of the fund in the market prior to the announcement of the plan.
Management's responsibilities are to all the shareholder interests in
the corporation. Although management should be compensated for
its ingenuity in devising the plan, it is fairer for this compensation
to be paid by all the stockholders (in the form of bonus or additional
salary) rather than by only those stockholders who sell their shares
to the management at a price which does not reflect disclosure of the
plan to open-end or liquidate.'
II
When A has accumulated as much B stock as it can on the
market and in private transactions, it will make a public solicitation
of tenders. This solicitation will typically be made in the form of an
advertisement in various financial and daily newspapers. In its
barest form this advertisement will usually announce an offer to pur-
chase a specified number of shares at a fixed price per share "subject
to the terms and conditions set forth in an Offering Letter, dated
." The advertisement will also state when the
offer terminates and explain where the Offering Letter and Letter
of Transmittal may be obtained. 5
Memorandum of SEC, Amicus Curiae, p. 2, Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., CCH FED. SEc.
L. REP. 1 91,699 (1st Cir. June 2, 1966). Compare the standard of materiality used
in James Blackstone Memorial Library Ass'n v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 264 F2d 445
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 815 (1959), and Lomman v. Lieb, 37 Pa. D. & C2d
305 (1965) (plaintiff must show that the sale was "assured"). See Symposium, Insider
Trading In Stocks, 21 Bus. LAw. 1009, 1017 (1966) (statement of A. Fleischer, Jr.).
73 For a discussion of a similar situation in connection with a tender offer, see
note 92 infra.
74This analysis seems consistent with the findings of the court in Speed v.
Tranaierica that Transamerica by its domination of the Axton-Fisher board of
directors, in effect, constituted its management. 99 F. Supp. at 833-34. In the
case where A accumulates enough shares in the market to elect the directors of B,
but has not disclosed its ability to do so, it is less likely that courts will impose
the responsibilities of management upon A.
Compare MANNF, op. cit. supra note 52, at ch. X.
75 If, as is usual, a broker will be paid a fee for procuring the tender of
shares, the amount of the fee will normally appear in the advertisement.
The New York Stock Exchange has very recently repealed its requirement that
member firms charge commissions when they tender securities for customers pur-
suant to a tender or exchange offer. The amount of the soliciting fee will be left to
the discretion of the member firms. New York Stock Exchange, M,F, Educafional
Circular No. 216, Nov. 18, 1966.
336 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.115:317
The Offering Letter contains the name of the stock sought and
the price offered. It also states the period during which the offer
will remain open and the period through which it may be extended.
In addition, it gives instructions for tendering shares and fixes the
date of payment. The Offering Letter also describes the conditions
under which the offeror will be obligated to purchase the shares.
Typically, the offeror's obligation is conditioned on the receipt of a
certain minimum number of shares with an option to take up as many
shares tendered over the minimum as the offeror desires.7" Although
the customary offer requires the offeror to purchase a specified number
of tendered shares if the minimum number are deposited, the offeror
will not be bound, under the terms of some offers, if the offeree suffers
a material adverse development.77  The Offering Letter will state
whether, if tenders exceed the minimum, the offeror will purchase
the shares on a pro rata or first-come, first-served basis. The Offering
Letter will also include a paragraph explaining the respective rights
of the offeror and offeree with respect to dividend payments and other
similar action taken by the corporation during the tender offer period.
Many Offering Letters contain the market price of the shares over a
period of time and a few indicate that sufficient funds have been
deposited to insure payment for the number of shares requested. 78  The
Offering Letter does not usually provide business or financial informa-
tion about the offeree company. On occasion, however, it contains a
summary of earnings and a dividend record and, in some cases, a
76 Assuming B has 1,000,000 shares outstanding and A has already accumulated
120,000 shares, the minimum number in our prototype case might be 390,000 shares.
The offeror usually reserves the option to take all shares tendered if the min-
imum number of shares are not tendered.
77See Offer To Purchase The First 65,000 Shares of Common Stock Tendered
of Pacific Insurance Company of New York, Sept. 16, 1966, p. 3, which stated:
Upon the occurrence, in the opinions of the Purchasers, of any of the
following events prior to the purchase of any shares pursuant to this Purchase
Offer, the Purchasers may by notice in writing delivered to the Depositary
withdraw such offer:
a) any significant increase in the aggregate number of outstanding
shares of voting stock of the Company or any material change in
its capitalization; or
b) any material adverse change in the financial condition of the Com-
pany; or
c) any other material adverse occurrence beyond the control of the
Purchasers.
See also Allied Products Corporation Offer to Purchase Shares of Common Stock
of Dayco Corporation, Oct. 24, 1966, p. 2 ("Allied may withdraw this offer . . .
[if] there has been any other material adverse occurrence affecting Dayco, Allied
or this offer").
78 It is understood that many banks will not agree to be the depositary of a
tender offer unless the funds necessary to acquire the shares are deposited with the
bank prior to the public announcement of the offer.
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statement concerning the offeror's intentions-for example, its intention
to seek representation on the board of directors."
The other document used in a public tender offer is the Letter of
Transmittal. It is drafted for use by the shareholder when he sends
his shares to the depositary (usually a bank) designated by the maker
of the tender offer. The Letter of Transmittal contains the formal
terms of the agreement between the offeror and the tendering
shareholders.
The problem to which this section of our article primarily ad-
dresses itself is the right of shareholders under present law to receive
information from the maker of a tender offer who has no relationship
to the company. Under federal law, any such right would have to
spring from Rule 10b-5. The Rule is clear in prohibiting any outright
misrepresentation or half-truth.8° Thus, an offer by a party without
financial resources to purchase the shares tendered would appear to
constitute a violation unless the incapacity is disclosed.8 But mis-
representations and obvious omissions aside, the key legal issue revolves
around whether there is anything in a bare public offer to purchase
shares at a fixed price which gives the shareholder a greater right to
information than he would have if he sold his shares on an exchange or
in the organized over-the-counter market. The only distinction between
the two situations is that in the tender offer the prospective buyer makes
some concrete statements. Insofar as the investment decision-making
process is concerned, these statements, in our hypothetical case, can be
summarized as: "A is willing to pay $25 per share for B stock if it can
buy at least 390,000 shares." The making of the tender offer puts the
shareholder on notice that someone is willing to pay a certain amount
for a large quantity of stock. Presumably the person willing to do so
thinks that the stock is (or is potentially) worth even more. Thus,
an important element in the shareholder's decision whether or not
to tender may be his judgment about the financial acuity of the person
making the offer. On occasion, the shareholder cannot make even
this judgment because he is not told whose money is at stake in the
making of the purchases contemplated by the tender offer.
At the same time, the tender offer is not in form or in principle
greatly removed from the classic market situation between two parties
dealing at arm's length. Most securities transactions involve differing
7 See note 95 infra.
80 An outsider violates Rule 10b-5 if he makes a false statement to induce the
sale of a security. See 3 Loss 1445; cf. Cooper v. North Jersey Trust Co., 226 F.
Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
81A tender offer by a party without financial resources may be viewed as an
attempt to manipulate the market if the offeror attempts to take advantage of the
increased market price.
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judgments about the value of the company involved. The buyer pur-
chases because he expects additional appreciation while the seller may
sell because he believes he can secure a better return on his money
elsewhere. Moreover, in the usual transaction on an organized
market, the seller of securities neither knows who his buyer is nor the
reasons for the buyer's purchases. The major difference between the
ordinary market sale and the sale pursuant to tender offer is that the
latter has been solicited-the buyer has expressed his willingness to
buy shares and may have enlisted the aid of brokers to encourage
holders of shares to sell.
Since our prototype case assumes that A is an "outsider" to the
corporation, the only basis under present law for imposing upon it an
affirmative duty of disclosure in its soliciting literature would rest on
the theory that the bare statements made are either misleading or that
certain statements necessary to make the statements made not mis-
leading have been omitted. In other words, if the courts require addi-
tional information to be included in tender offers, they must conclude
that the minimal statements made imply to those reading them the
existence or nonexistence of certain additional facts which must be
accounted for by the offeror." For example, if an offer to buy at a
fixed price somehow conveys the notion that the offeror does not
intend to seek a subsequent merger with the offeree company, the
offer must negate that inference when a merger is contemplated. Only
such a theory of disclosure by implication can provide a general
theoretical basis for imposing extensive disclosure responsibilities upon
the offeror.' We now turn to an examination of specific disclosure
questions that may confront a party making a tender offer.
When A offers to buy B stock at $25 per share, does A imply
that it thinks B stock is worth around $25, but not more? From time
to time, there have been suggestions that an offer to buy securities at
a particular price carries such an implication. In 1944 the Chief
Counsel to the SEC's Division of Corporate Finance gave three ex-
82 In the absence of judicial decisions or legislative direction with respect to
what can be implied from the simple statement, "I am willing to buy your shares
at $-," it would seem that the appropriate test is what people who read tender
offers actually believe is meant by such a statement. We do not know of any
empirical study which seeks to answer this question.
83An alternative theory, which could probably not be implied from existing
rules (but might be implemented through new rules), argues that special disclosure
protections are necessary whenever higher than normal compensation is paid to
brokers to induce them to make rapid and aggressive efforts to consummate the
desired transaction. See Heller, "Integration" of the Dissemination of Infor a tion
Under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 29 LAw
& CONTEM,. PRoB., 749, 763-65 (1964). Special incentives for brokers are typically
present in connection with the making of tender offers. New York Stock Exchange,
M.F. Educational Circular No. 216, Nov. 18, 1966.
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amples of situations involving omissions to state a material fact neces-
sary to make a statement made not misleading."' One of these examples
concerned a corporation which offered to repurchase some of its bonds
at a fixed price which was below the prevailing market price of the
bonds.' The Chief Counsel concluded that the offer to purchase at a
particular price contained an implied representation that the offering
price was at least equal to the prevailing market price. The examples
did not appear to assume the existence of any other undisclosed mate-
rial information-indeed, in each example, financial information was
sent along with the offer.8 6 The Chief Counsel's conclusions seem un-
warranted in the absence of a special relationship between the offeror
and the offeree requiring the offeror to come forward with material,
generally unavailable information. 7  In all of the examples cited such
a relationship seems to have existed.as Nevertheless, counsel may be
inclined to advise even an outsider to disclose the prevailing market
price in the unusual case where that price is greater than the tender
offer price and is not readily available. 9
The possible implications of the Chief Counsel's conclusions
should be tested against the case in which A, a stranger to B, knows
that, if it can gain control of B, it can sell B's inventory for twice the
price B normally gets for it. Earlier we concluded that, under similar
facts, A could purchase B shares in the market without disclosing its
plans.0  A similar conclusion was reached in the only case which
considered this problem in the context of a public solicitation for
84 Address by Edward H. Cashion Before National Association of State Secu-
rities Commissioners, Dec. 13, 1944, pp. 6-7, on file in Biddle Law Library, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania. The examples cited did not involve litigated cases since in
each case informal action by the Commission resulted in appropriate remedial
responses.
85The other examples involved purchases by controlling shareholders under
similar circumstances.
86 The Chief Counsel seemed to think that the sending of this information put
the offeror in a worse position than it would have been had it not sent the infor-
mation. In a very confusing statement he categorized this information as "repre-
sentations as to the value of the securities involved." Id. at 7. If the material sent
really amounted to such a representation, his conclusion that the prevailing market
price, the usual measure of value, should have been stated, seems correct.
873 Loss 1456-57; see Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 843
(D. Del. 1951).
8It might be argued that bondholders are arm's-length creditors and no sort
of fiduciary relationship extends from the corporation to them. But see 3 Loss
1454.
89 It has been held that an insider need not disclose the market price where it is
readily available. Hafner v. Forest Labs., Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. Rae. 91,443
(S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 345 F2d 167 (2d Cir. 1965).
Considerations similar to those discussed in the text are applicable when a rival
makes a tender at a higher price.
90 See text accompanying notes 71-73 supra. There seems to be little doubt
that under present concepts A4 could purchase the inventory without disclosing that
his purchase was motivated by an opportunity to sell it elsewhere at a higher price.
1967]
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tenders. 1  In that case, a syndicate made a tender offer for 80% of
the shares of Tacony-Palmyra Bridge Company. The syndicate de-
vised a plan under which it would be able, in effect, to resell the assets
of the corporation at a substantial profit. These plans were not dis-
closed in the tender offer. The court rejected plaintiff's contention
that the syndicate had a duty to disclose its plans:
Surely plaintiffs must have anticipated the likelihood
that the defendants had a profit-making purpose in mind,
especially when the price per share offered to them was sub-
stantially higher than the market value of the shares ....
[I]n the absence of any fiduciary duty it was not incumbent
upon the defendants to divulge their plans with respect to a
subsequent resale of the property. The cases imposing a duty
on the part of a purchaser of shares of stock to disclose his
knowledge of future prospects and plans all involve situations
where the purchaser holds a fiduciary position and where the
knowledge has been obtained by virtue of an "inside"
position.2
91 Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753 (D.NJ. 1955) ; cf. Slavin v. German-
town Fire Ins. Co., 174 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1949); Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp.
49 (N.D. Ohio 1959), aff'd per curiam, 279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960).
92 133 F. Supp. at 764-65. The force of the court's statement is somewhat
diminished by its observation toward the end of the opinion that the scheme by
which the syndicate planned to sell the assets of the corporation at a profit "was
highly speculative and uncertain, both as to its ultimate materiality and its legality."
Id. at 767.
Earlier, in connection with the purchase by A of shares in B, a closed-end fund,
which A intended to open-end or liquidate, we suggested that A could not buy any
shares in the market after there was a "reasonable probability" that its plan would be
adopted. See text accompanying notes 71-73 supra. If A makes a tender offer for B
shares and sets the minimum at the number of shares needed to approve an open-
ending or liquidation, A takes no risk in effectuating its plans-although A still bears
the normal market risk connected with the maintenance in value of the fund's portfolio.
Nevertheless, strong arguments can be made for permitting A to make a tender offer
without disclosing its plans under these circumstances. A's plans were not conceived
while an insider nor do they stem from the appropriation of confidential corporate
information. Thus, the legal basis for compelling disclosure would rest on some aspect
of the broad "fairness" theory previously discussed. Indeed, if disclosure were required,
the tender offer probably could not be successful-it simply would not be attempted.
This result seems undesirable if it is assumed that the disparity between the market
price of these shares and their intrinsic value represents irrational market behavior and
thus impairs its allocational efficiency. Compare Complaint, Columbia Pictures Corp. v.
Clairmont, Civil No. 3581, S.D.N.Y., 1966 (failure to disclose alleged plan of liquida-
tion when making a tender offer attacked as a material nondisclosure).
Both the Williams Bill and the SEC's proposal would require persons who
make a tender offer seeking control or representation on the board of directors to
disclose their plans "with respect to the conduct and continuation of the business"
of the offeree company. S. 2731, § 10(c) (1) (iii); SEC Memorandum on S. 2731,
§ 13(d) (1) (A) (iii). Such a requirement raises a number of problems. Intentions
with respect to the conduct of the business are often nebulous and can only be
well defined when A assumes control of B and gets a better insight into its opera-
tions. At any rate, there seems to be little justification for requiring greater dis-
closure about the future plans of an outsider than is required about the future plans
of management.
A "participant" in a proxy contest must disclose whether it has any arrange-
ment or understanding with any person "with respect to any future transactions to
which the issuer or any of its affiliates will or may be a party." SEC Schedule
14B, Item 4(b), 17 C.F.R. following § 240.14a-1 (1964).
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The rationale of Mills v. Sarjem extends to the necessity of dis-
closing specific plans such as the plan to merge A and B. Indeed, the
argument for requiring disclosure of such an intention in the tender
offer must run the additional hurdle of showing that the intention to
merge is a material fact.' However, as suggested earlier, if prior to
the completion of the tender offer, the managements of B and A have
agreed in principle on the terms of a merger, A should make appro-
priate disclosures.94 Because the principles in this area are far from
fully defined, cautious counsel may recommend a statement as to the
offeror's plans about a possible merger.0
A somewhat similar problem arises where the purchase price for
B's shares is acquired through short-term financing which is converted
into long-term financing after B is merged into A. This device in
effect permits the B shareholder to be bought out at least in part with
his own assets."5 Accordingly, it may be contended that A is an
"insider" in respect of the purchases and burdened with the correlative
duties. However, viewed as a problem of disclosure of A's plans for
the use of B's assets, this case does not appear to be significantly dif-
ferent from the case where A knows that he can profitably dispose of
B's inventory.9
93 Normally a proposed merger will not be considered a material fact until the
managements of the companies to be merged have agreed in principle on specific
terms for concluding the merger. See cases cited at note 72 supra. Compare Ross
v. Paul Hardeman, Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 191,483 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (plain-
tiff entitled to have interrogation answered which related to an alleged omission in a
prospectus concerning plans of defendant to merge with another corporation).
For a general discussion of the necessity to disclose plans for future action,
see Comment, The Regulation of Corporate Tender Offers Under Federal Securities
Law: A New Challenge For Ride 10b-5, 33 U. CHi. L. Rxv. 359, 367-68 (1966).
94 See text accompanying note 66 supra.
95 See Offer To Purchase Common Stock of Wagner Electric Corporation,
May 31, 1966 ("If the Purchaser purchases Common Stock tendered pursuant to
this offer it may in the future offer to acquire the entire business of Wagner Electric
Corporation by purchase, merger or otherwise. The Purchaser has had discussions
with the management of Wagner Electric Corporation regarding a possible merger
with the latter but no agreement or understanding regarding such a transaction was
reached.") ; Invitation for Tenders of 413,000 Shares of Common Stock of Allied
Mills, Inc., July 28, 1965 ("Continental has no present plans to change Allied Mills'
capital structure or existence. It does plan, if the tendered shares are purchased,
to vote the shares for its own nominees to the board of directors."). See also Allied
Products Corporation Offer To Purchase Shares of Common Stock of Dayco Cor-
poration, Oct. 24, 1966, p. 3; Foremost Dairies, Inc. Offer to Purchase 550,000
Shares of Common Stock of McKesson & Robbins, Inc., Sept 2, 1966, p. 2.
Expression of a firm intention to effect a subsequent merger may result in
undesirable tax consequences for the offeror. See note 12 supra.
90 Similar financing occurred in Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753
(D.N.J. 1955). The bank loans in that case were paid off from what was, in effect,
a sale of the offeree company's assets.
S7 The SEC proposal requires disclosure of the source and amount of considera-
tion used in purchasing the stock tendered and also the names of any parties from
whom funds have been borrowed for the purpose of making such purchases. SEC
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A final problem relating to the disclosure of the offeror's inten-
tions relates to his intent to acquire control of the offeree company. In
the usual tender offer it is clear from the number of shares sought
whether or not the offeror seeks to assert a degree of control. How-
ever, in some cases it is only when the shares sought by the tender
offer are added to existing holdings of the offeror or his associates that
it is clear that the offeror is seeking control. The Williams Bill and
the SEC proposal require disclosure of the number of shares bene-
ficially owned by the maker of the tender offer and his associates; the
SEC proposal also requires disclosure of the number of shares which
such persons have a right to acquire. 8 As a matter of practice offerors
have disclosed their holdings when making a tender offer. However,
for the reasons discussed above, it seems that normally there is no
legal requirement to make such disclosures or to disclose the intent to
exercise control.99
One implication which may be drawn from the statement "A is
willing to pay $25 per share for B stock" is that $25 per share is the
best price that A is willing to pay during the period the tender offer is
open.10 The Commission has indicated in one proceeding that such
Memorandum on S. 2731, § 13(d) (1) (A) (ii). See also SEC Schedule 14B, Item
3(d), 17 C.F.R. following §240.14a-11 (1964). Compare S. 2731, §10(c)(1)(ii)
(only the source of funds need be disclosed). The Commonwealth legislation only
requires disclosure of the arrangements made to ensure that payment can be made
for the stock tendered. See note 45 .rtpra.
A's ability to finance the purchase of the B shares is restricted by regulations
of the Federal Reserve Board. Thus, A could not borrow money from a bank and
secure his obligation with the B shares, except in compliance with the margin rules,
which presently permit loans of up to 30% on the value of the securities purchased.
See Regulation U, 12 C.F.R. § 221 (1964) (applies to a stock-secured loan made for
the purpose of purchasing a controlling interest in a corporation). However, a bank
can loan money to A to purchase the B shares if the loan is not secured by a pledge
of those shares. Moreover, if B is not a listed company, the margin restrictions of
the Federal Reserve Board regulations would not apply.
If a member of a national securities exchange, or a firm which transacts busi-
ness through such a member, helps arrange the financing for A's purchase, questions
may arise as to the applicability of the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation T.
12 C.F.R. § 220 (1964).
8 S. 2731, § 10(c) (1) (iv) ; SEC Memorandum on S. 2731, § 13(d) (1) (A) (iv).
The Commonwealth legislation contains provisions similar to those in the Williams
Bill. See note 45 supra.
99 The complaint in a recent case poses the problem of the maker of a tender
offer who publicly announced that it was not seeking control, but who sought to
exert control once the tender offer had been successfully completed. Complaint,
Columbia Pictures Corp. v. Clairmont, Civil No. 3581, S.D.N.Y., 1966.
100 During the tender period securities traders may enter into arbitrage trans-
actions with respect to the securities sought to be acquired. A trader will buy
the security on the trading market and tender it to the offeror. Any profit will
result from a spread between the trading market price of the stock and the tender
price. Although the market price normally shoots up to approximately the tender
offer price on announcement of the tender, there may be a small spread reflecting
the uncertainty of the market as to whether or not the tender will be accepted.
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an inference should be drawn from that statement.'' In that proceeding
Fruit of the Loom transmitted an offer by Bates Manufacturing
Company to purchase shares of Fruit of the Loom at $50 per share
of preferred stock and $20 per share of common stock and
recommended that the shareholders accept the offer. Management
informed its shareholders that it would tender its shares pursuant
to the Bates offer. After the Bates offer was made public,
Philadelphia & Reading offered to pay $51.50 per share of
Fruit of the Loom preferred stock and $23 per share of Fruit of the
Loom common stock. To combat this offer Bates contracted with a
brokerage firm to make purchases on the open market at prices com-
petitive with the Philadelphia & Reading offer. Two members of
Fruit of the Loom management sold their shares to the brokerage firm
at prices above those contained in the Bates tender offer. In addition,
Fruit of the Loom management failed to inform its shareholders about
the existence of Philadelphia & Reading's offer or the willingness of
Bates to pay more than its published offer to meet the Philadelphia
& Reading offer.
In support of its request for an injunction the Commission argued
that Fruit of the Loom management breached a duty to its shareholders
when, after it recommended acceptance of the Bates offer, it failed to
inform its shareholders of the changes in circumstances which no
longer made it advisable for Fruit of the Loom shareholders to accept
the Bates offer. This argument accords with established principles of
law. 2  However, the Commission also argued that "Bates violated
Rule lOb-5 by making a public offer to purchase stock of Fruit of the
Loom at one price and then pursuing a secretive program . . . to pay
higher and varying prices." 103 The Commission buttressed this argu-
ment by pointing to the use of Fruit of the Loom's management in
furthering the offer and to Bates' knowing participation in the breach
of fiduciary responsibility by Fruit of the Loom's management. It is
not clear that the Commission could have obtained judicial approval
for its position in the absence of the buttressing arguments. The
SEC's proposed redraft of the Williams Bill contains a provision that
where the terms of a tender offer are changed to increase the con-
sideration to be paid for securities tendered, all shares, including those
101 Memorandum for Plaintiff in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
SEC v. Fruit of the Loom, Inc., Civil No. 61-640, S.D.N.Y., Feb. 24, 1961, reported
in 27 SEC AxN. REP. 92-93 (1961). The defendants consented to a permanent
injunction and made the rescission offers requested by the Commission.
102 See PROSSER, TORTS 711 (3d ed. 1964).
103 Memorandum for Plaintiff in Support of Motion for a Preliminary Injunc-
tion, p. 11, SEC v. Fruit of the Loom, Inc., Civil No. 61-640, S.D.N.Y., Feb. 24,
1961.
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tendered prior to the change, shall be given the increased considera-
tion.'" Of particular significance is the Commission's explanation
that the purpose of this provision is avoidance of the discriminatory
effect of paying some holders more than others "since security holders
tendering their shares pursuant to a tender offer normally assume that
all tendering security holders will receive the same price." 105
If the Commission's judgment about the normal expectations of
securities holders is right, a number of problems arise under present
law with respect to A's conduct after the tender offer has expired. Can
A now buy additional B shares in the market at prices in excess of $25
per share? Can A make a new tender offer at $28 per share or
negotiate with hold-outs for the purchase of their shares at $28 per
share? It is difficult to distinguish these post-tender offer transactions
from the pre-tender offer transactions in which shareholders, unaware
of A's impending tender offer, sell their shares for $22 per share1 06
As indicated earlier, we do not think that under present law these
shareholders have a right to receive the difference between what they
received and the tender offer price. Neither should any shareholder
who tendered his shares for $25 per share have any additional claim
because a higher price was paid for shares purchased after the tender
period expired. The more difficult case arises when A decides to close
the original tender offer early because it is not producing sufficient
tenders. Immediately thereafter, A publishes a new tender offer at
$28. The Commission's reasoning may suggest that, in order to
terminate its tender offer on a date prior to that announced in the
offer, A would have to give those shareholders who tendered under
the original offer an opportunity to tender under the new offer."'
104 SEC Memorandum on S. 2731, § 14(d) (5). The Ontario Securities Act
contains a similar provision. Ontario Securities Act §83(1). In addition, the
Jenkins Committee recommended adoption of such a provision in the British legisla-
tion. Jenkins Report 1294(e). Australia does not have such a provision.
A can almost always buy shares-and should be permitted to do so-in the open
market at less than the tender price. An offer to buy at a specified price necessarily
carries the implication that the offeror is willing to buy shares at less than the
specified price.
105 SEC Memorandum on S. 2731, at 20. It could be argued that in the usual
case a shareholder will assume that, if the maker of a tender offer wants shares
badly enough, he will pay more than he is presently offering. Each shareholder takes
the risk of guessing whether or not more will eventually be offered. This risk is
the essence of arm's-length bargaining. Courts will normally mitigate this risk only
when a special relationship exists between the parties.
10 B shareholders in the post-tender offer period may be better informed than B
shareholders in the pre-tender offer period because they have been put on notice by
the tender offer that there has been an active interest in acquiring B stock and
that there may be an interest in acquiring additional shares.
107 Some shareholders acting on "a bird in the hand" theory may be content to
accept payment under the original tender offer.
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Problems arising from the Commission's assumptions about share-
holder expectations may perhaps be avoided by the use of a disclaimer
provision. One version of such a provision might read:
This offer to purchase 390,000 B shares at $25 should
not be construed to mean that A may not during the tender
period or thereafter buy B shares on or off the Exchange
at prices below or in excess of $25, or that A will not raise its
tender offer price at a subsequent date.
The content of such a disclaimer will depend on the range of possi-
bilities that occur to the lawyer preparing it.'08 The suggested dis-
claimer should be effective except perhaps where A has already com-
mitted itself to carry out any of the actions described in the disclaimer.10 9
There has been a spasmodic use of "blind" tender offers in which
the identity of the principal has been undisclosed."0 Normally it seems
proper to make such a tender offer. However, its use may be ques-
tioned where acquisition by the undisclosed principal in effect imposes
on the completion of the tender offer an undisclosed condition, such as
approval by an administrative agency or the possibility of successful
action under a statute, such as the antitrust laws."' Although no
court has said that an insider cannot make a blind tender offer,"' it is
1o8See Offer To Purchase 300,000 Shares of Common Stock of the Philip
Carey Manufacturing Company, Feb. 8, 1966:
During the period of this offer, Purchaser may purchase shares of Philip
Carey Common Stock in the market at not in excess of the tender price
of $38.00 per share offered hereunder, but such purchases, if any, will be
in addition to any shares purchased hereunder and will not diminish its
obligation to purchase shares under this offer.
109 For a discussion of the limitations on the effectiveness of disclaimer clauses,
see 3 Loss 1814-17; cf. Heft, Kahn & Infante, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7020
(Feb. 11, 1963).
110 Offer To Buy 500,000 Shares of Common Stock of Studebaker Corporation,
Feb. 8, 1966 ("Lehman Brothers and Lazard Frares & Co., as authorized agents
of certain prospective purchasers") ; Offer To Purchase the First 65,000 Shares ot
Common Stock Tendered of Pacific Insurance Company of New York, Sept. 16,
1966 ("For a limited period . . . certain purchasers . . . acting severally through
Laidlaw & Company").
.11 Both the Williams Bill and the SEC proposal require disclosure of the
identity and background of any person by whom or on whose behalf a tender offer
is made. S. 2731, § 10(c) (1) (i) ; SEC Memorandum on S. 2731, § 13(d) (1) (A) (i).
Both the Australian and British legislation forbid blind tender offers. Australia
Companies Act, Tenth Schedule, pt. B, 11111, 4; British Dealers Rules § 1(a). On
the other hand, the Kimber Report recommended against requiring disclosure of the
identity of the maker of the tender offer because of a fear that such a requirement
might discourage some tender offers from being made. Kimber Report 25.
112 A number of courts have upheld purchases by insiders who hid their identity.
Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Ohio 1959), aff'd per curiam, 279
F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960); Vulcanized Rubber & Plastics Co. v. Scheckter, 400 Pa.
405, 162 A.2d 400 (1960). Compare Beggy v. Deike, 413 Pa. 74, 196 A.2d 179
(1963). Whether the failure to disclose his identity without more will subject an
insider to liability was left open in List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 464
n.4 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965), and Cochran v. Channing Corp.,
211 F. Supp. 239, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). See Brief for National Association of
Securities Dealers, Hughes & Treat, 22 S.E.C. 623 (1946) (brokerage firm should
be under no duty to disclose whether its client is an officer or director of a company).
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likely that such a situation will be scrutinized very carefully in order
to be sure that there were no material undisclosed facts.113
Another area in which disclosure may have to be made relates to
the minimum number of shares which must be tendered before the
offeror's obligation matures. In the prototype case 390,000 shares are
required. Suppose A knows that its associates hold 100,000 shares
and plan to tender them. Information about the associates' holdings
and the fact that they will be counted in determining whether or not
the minimum has been reached may help B shareholders assess the likeli-
hood of the tender offer's success. A correct assessment is important
to B shareholders since the act of tendering their shares normally elim-
inates the alternative of selling their shares in a market in which the
price of the stock is affected by the existence of the outstanding tender
offer. In addition, if the tender offer is made on a first-come, first-
served basis, such information may be important in persuading a
shareholder not unnecessarily to delay his tender." 4 If the tender offer
is made on a pro rata basis, the information may perhaps help a share-
holder gauge the likelihood of an extension of the offer and the
consequent immobilization of his stock." 5
When the Offering Letter contains information beyond the bare
minimum assumed in the preceding discussion, additional but familiar
problems of disclosure arise. For example, if a statement of the
earnings of B through its last fiscal year is set forth in the Offering
Letter, and earnings since the end of the fiscal year have risen sharply,
such information probably must be disclosed unless it could not reason-
ably have been known to the person making the tender offer. In
other words, the more information given in the Offering Letter, the
greater the likelihood of problems relating to the failure to disclose.
The problem is illustrated by a recent tender offer for the stock of
Columbia Pictures Corporation in which the agent for the offeror,
Banque de Paris, made the statement that the purpose of the offer was
to acquire an "investment" position. When after the successful com-
pletion of the tender, the offeror, certain parties to whom it had sold
part of the shares acquired and other large Columbia stockholders re-
quested board representation, management brought suit to prevent the
shares acquired from being voted for the reason, among others, that
113 See Broffe v. Horton, 172 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1949); Taylor v. Wright, 69
Cal. App. 2d 371, 159 P.2d 980 (1945); Beggy v. Deike, 413 Pa. 74, 196 A2d 179
(1963) ; 3 Loss 1465.
114 Since the offeror wishes to encourage such an attitude he will probably in-
clude such information.
115 The attitude of the American and Commonwealth legislation toward the dis-
closure of the number of shares beneficially owned by the maker of the tender offer
and his associates is described in note 45 supra and text accompanying note 98 s2upra..
ACQUISITION BY TENDER OFFER
the conduct of the offeror and its associates was inconsistent with the
prior representations made on behalf of the offeror.:"6
The conclusion that the best protection against potential liability
lies in minimizing disclosure runs counter to the Commission's regu-
latory approach which is oriented toward encouraging disclosure. Our
prior discussion suggested that courts, operating in an adjudicatory
context, probably will not-and probably should not-take steps to
broaden disclosure requirements in the making of tender offers. If
additional disclosure is desirable, the nature of such disclosure should
be worked out in the legislative process--either by congressional enact-
ment of statutory amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
or by the Commission through its rule-making powers.
If Congress decides not to enact legislation in this area, it is
possible that the Commission will write rules under section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which embody many of the sug-
gestions it has made in its comments on the Williams Bill. The
authority of the Commission to draft rules defining "any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance" is broader than the authority of a
court in judging whether or not particular conduct comes within
that definition." 7
We cannot predict the provisions which any Commission rules
might contain. Although the Williams Bill and the Commission's
proposed redraft do not specifically call for information about the
offeree company, it is possible that the rules would require such in-
formation. The disclosure requirements imposed in connection with
exchange offers (stock tender offers) have been pointed to as providing
a convenient analogy for defining the proper disclosure requirements
for cash tender offers.'18 In the exchange offer (in which the stock
offered in exchange for the shares tendered must be registered under
the Securities Act of 1933), the Commission requires disclosure of
116 Complaint, Columbia Pictures Corp. v. Clairmont, Civil No. 3581, S.D.N.Y.,
1966. After the complaint was filed, Columbia and Banque de Paris apparently
entered into an agreement under which the Banque will hold its stock as an invest-
ment, receive minority representation on the Columbia board of directors and will
not act alone or jointly with other shareholders to exercise control over Columbia.
Wall Street Journal, Nov. 15, 1966, p. 2, cols. 3-6.
117 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
In that case the Commission asked the court to fix a reasonable waiting period
after announcement of Texas Gulf's mining discovery was made during which in-
siders should not have been allowed to trade. The waiting period was designed to
give the public an opportunity to absorb the information announced. The court
thought it inappropriate for it to fix such a period. It suggested that "if a waiting
period is to be fixed, this could be most appropriately done by the Commission,
which was established by Congress with broad rule-making powers." Ibid. See
Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Adminis-
trative Policy, 78 HAiv. L. Rxv. 921, 946-47 (1965).
118 See Cohen, A Note on Takeover Bids and Corporate Purchases of Stock,
22 Bus. LAw. 149 (1966).
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the terms of the offer and of pertinent business and financial data
concerning both the offeror and offeree companies. These disclosure
requirements may be justified on two theories. First, an exchange offer
closely resembles a merger transaction and the shareholder should have
sufficient information about the stock he is offered and the stock he
is asked to give up before deciding on the course of action he should
take.'19 Second, if the exchange offer is successful, the tendering share-
holder will own an interest in a company, a significant part of whose
assets may be represented by stock in the offeree company.
In a cash tender offer there is no need to give the shareholders
of the offeree company information about the business operations and
119 Exchange offers are unusual. First, as indicated in the text, they must be
registered under the Securities Act of 1933 and will have to comply with state
Blue Sky laws. Compliance with these requirements considerably increases the ex-
penses of the offer and is time-consuming. Second, to make the requisite disclosures
about the sought-after company may require the cooperation of management if there
is no published information about the company. Third, exchange offers lack the
element of surprise-so often necessary for a successful tender offer-since B will
be informed of its pendency. The SEC staff may require the offeror to ask the
offeree for the latest financial and business information about its operation. In any
case, the filing of A's registration statement will alert B. It appears that the Com-
mission will not grant confidential treatment to the statement when filed. One possi-
bility would be for the staff of the Commission to "pre-clear" the registration state-
ment so that, when filed and made public, it will already reflect the comments of
the staff and can be used immediately to solicit tenders. Finally, in an exchange
offer involving registration under the Securities Act, A is severely restricted under
§ 5 of the act, 48 Stat. 77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1964), with respect
to statements made, particularly during the period prior to the time that the regis-
tration statement becomes effective. The management of B, on the other hand,
would not be under such restrictions in its opposition to the offer.
An exchange offer raises other problems. In order for the transaction to be
nontaxable, the offer must consist of voting stock, common or preferred, and, upon
completion of the offer, the acquiring company must own at least 80% of the total
combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at least 80% of
the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of the acquired company.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §368(a)(1)(B). See also note 12 .rupra. Moreover,
unless stock has already been authorized, the offeror must secure a vote of its
shareholders for an appropriate amendment to its charter. Furthermore, even if
stock has already been authorized, issuance of the shares in connection with the
exchange offer may need shareholder approval under certain state laws, if the stock
to be issued equals one-sixth of the voting power of the corporation, e.g., Oxio
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.01, 1701.84 (1964), or, under the rules of the major ex-
changes, if the common stock to be issued could result in an increase of outstanding
common stock of roughly 20%. See, e.g., NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, COMP-ANY
MANUAL A-284(3). Finally, if the shares to be issued by the offeror constitute
a substantial part of its outstanding stock, it may be contended that the transac-
tion constitutes a de facto merger giving appraisal and voting rights to the share-
holders of the offering company. Compare Appelstein v. United Board & Carton
Corp., 60 N.J. Super. 333, 159 A.2d 146, aff'd per curiam, 33 N.J. 72, 161 A.2d 474
(1960), with Orzeck v. Englehart, 41 Del. Ch. 361, 195 A.2d 375 (1963).
An unresolved Securities Act problem in exchange offers relates to the status
of a controlling person of the company proposed to be acquired who negotiates with
the offeror prior to the exchange offer and agrees to tender his shares if the offer
is made. Apparently the staff of the Commission takes the view that, although the
offeror's shares exchanged in the tender offer are registered, the controlling person
acquires his shares as an "underwriter" and accordingly may not resell them with-
out registration or unless an exemption is available. If the controlling person does
not negotiate with the offeror or enter into any prior arrangements for the tender
of his stock, he is apparently free to resell any shares acquired.
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financial condition of the offeror. Even the need for information about
the offeree company is not as clear as in the exchange offer. The tender-
ing stockholder will not have a continuing interest in the offeree
company through his ownership of stock in the offeror company. More-
over, there is nothing compelling about the attempt to analogize the
tender offer to a merger. A cash tender offer can equally well be
viewed as a form of a market purchase. In the context of a sale in
the market the shareholder is only entitled to the information already
made available by company management.
12 0
Even accepting the merger analogy, the crucial question is who
should be burdened with the duty of supplying the information about the
offeree company. Management generally is the proper party to furnish
information about the company to the shareholders. It prepared the
information which is already public and it has access to nonpublic
material information which is relevant in evaluating the present value
of the stock. An outsider such as the person making a tender offer can,
in the usual case, only be expected to provide publicly available in-
formation about the offeree company. It is understood that the Com-
mission has recognized this limitation by permitting the offeror in an
exchange offer to obtain from public sources, including prior registra-
tion statements under the securities laws and reports filed with the
state and federal authorities, the information about the offeree company
it is required to put in the prospectus.' The most helpful suggestion
with respect to this problem-for both exchange offers and cash tender
offers-is contained in the Australian Companies Act which requires
the offeree company either to gather certain information 122 and transmit
it to its shareholders or to give it to the offeror which then must make
the information available to the offeree shareholders.'23
0 The present Chairman of the SEC has argued that, where a tender offer
involves a potential change of control, a new, or at least vastly changed, company
is created. Thus a shareholder's decision not to tender his shares amounts to a
decision to purchase shares in the new company. This type of argument attempts
to lay a basis for requiring a "reverse prospectus" when a cash tender offer is
made. Cohen, mtpra note 117, at 152.
The analysis offered by Chairman Cohen would undoubtedly surprise the typical
offeror. His intent is to induce the shareholders of the offeree company to sell
their shares to him; he does not conceive his offer to be an invitation to invest in
the enterprise which he seeks to take over. Indeed, if enough shareholders make
what Chairman Cohen characterizes as a decision to invest in the new enterprise by
not tendering their shares, the tender offer will fail and the new enterprise will not
materialize.
121 Compare SEC Rule 409, 17 C.F.R. § 230.409 (1964) (information need not
be furnished where it is unknown and not reasonably available to the registrant).
122This information includes any material undisclosed facts about the financial
condition of the company which are not reflected in the last published reports of the
company.
=Australia Companies Act §184(3). In his study of the British experience
with tender offers, Weinberg argues that directors of the offeree company should
send shareholders information with respect to the latest financial position of the corn-
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III
Our discussion has focused primarily on problems relating to the
disclosure of information in the tender offer. There are also sub-
stantive problems arising out of the way in which a tender offer may
be conducted. A's interests are best served if B shareholders can be
induced to tender their shares early, thus freezing their interests with-
out, however, obligating A until it is sure that its objectives can be
achieved. The technique which accomplishes this objective is the
first-come, first-served tender offer. In our prototype case A would
usually not be able to use such a form of tender offer. The New York
Stock Exchange has stated that the use of such an offer by a company
subject to its regulation is "normally objectionable." 12 It requires
that acceptance of shares be on a pro rata basis for a minimum period
of ten days. This requirement implements the Exchange policy of
providing all stockholders of a company "an opportunity to participate
on equal terms in any offer made which may affect the rights and bene-
fits of such stockholders." 125 The ten-day breathing period, according
to the Exchange, puts shareholders living at a distance from the place
of tender on an equal footing with those who live nearby. It also
prevents insiders of the offeree corporation (and their friends) from
being first in line with their shares.
The Commission's redraft of the Williams Bill goes further. It
requires all tender offers to be on a pro rata basis.' 28 The Commission
argued that such a provision discourages hasty and ill-considered
action and generally is fairer to all security holders. This provision
encourages the delay of any tender until the last day on which the
pany and with respect to the interests of the directors. He suggests that transac-
tions by the directors in the stock of the offeree and offeror companies within the
past year and details of the directors' service agreements be disclosed in the ma-
terials sent to the shareholders. WEINBERG, TAKE-OVERS AND AMALGAMATIONS 151
(1963) ; see text accompanying notes 161-64 infra.
324 NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, COMPANY MANUAL A-179. The Company
Manual appears to require pro rata offers whenever a tender offer is made by a listed
company, whether or not the offeree company is listed. If a nonlisted company
makes an offer for a listed company, the Exchange's policy is probably inapplicable,
because the Exchange does not have any jurisdiction over the nonlisted company.
However, if a member firm participates in the offer the Exchange may request
the firm to ask the offeror to abide by the Exchange's policy.
It is understood that the American Stock Exchange has an informal policy
which closely resembles that of the New York Stock Exchange.
= Ibid. The reach of this policy is not clear. Does it prevent a New York
Stock Exchange lifted corporation from making an offer to buy all the shares of
one shareholder at a price above market without making the offer available to all
the other shareholders of that corporation?
126 SEC Memorandum on S. 2731, § 14(d) (4). For a discussion of the Com-
monwealth legislation, see note 47 supra.
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offer is open.' 7 In this respect it gives management many of the
advantages in combatting the offer that would derive from a require-
ment that management be notified in advance of the publication of a
tender offer. 128
The mechanics of the typical tender offer include the making of
an offer to buy by the person seeking to acquire the shares and the
acceptance of that offer by the shareholders when they return the
Transmittal Letter and deposit their stock with the depositary named
in the Transmittal Letter. The usual Transmittal Letter states that the
tendering shareholder accepts the offer made and deposits his stock
irrevocably for a specified period, all in accordance with the terms
and conditions set forth in the Offering Letter and the Letter of
Transmittal. Suppose that in our prototype case the market drops
sharply after 30,000 shares have been tendered. Can A withdraw the
offer at a date prior to the termination date set forth in the offer?
Normally an offer may be withdrawn before it is accepted.? 9 The
tender of shares constitutes an acceptance of A's offer by the tendering
shareholders. The contract created is, however, subject to a condition
subsequent-the tender of 390,000 shares. A's withdrawal of the offer
makes it impossible for the condition to occur. Since A prevented
the condition from occurring, the condition will probably be excused
and A's obligation to purchase the 30,000 shares tendered becomes
absolute.' The shareholders who did not tender their shares might
argue that they did not do so because the pro rata nature of the offer
implied that there was no need to tender shares until the end of the
period stated in the offer. Their theory would be that they relied to their
127For the protection of those who do not wait to tender their shares, the
Commission also proposes that a tender offer permit any shareholder to withdraw
his shares at any time until the expiration of seven days after the offer has been
published. SEC Memorandum on S. 2731, § 14(d) (3).
128 See text accompanying notes 38-41 supra.
129 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 38-40 (1963 ed.). New York has a statute making a
written offer which states that it will be irrevocable for a stated period binding on
the offeror. N.Y. Gm:. OBLiG. LAW § 5-1109. Tender offers typically do not expressly
state that they are irrevocable. Under certain circumstances courts may imply that
the offer is irrevocable for a specific period. See Jarka Corp. v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd.,
182 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1950). It is not clear to what extent a tender offer published
in the New York Times or the Wall Street Journal by A, a Delaware corporation,
for the stock of B, an Ohio corporation with shareholders scattered throughout the
country, calling for deposit of shares with a New York bank, will be governed by the
New York General Obligation Law.
UNIFORM COMMERCIL Cons § 2-205 contains a provision similar to that in the
New York General Obligation Law. However, by its terms this section is applicable
only to the purchase or sale of "goods." The definition of "goods" specifically
excludes investment securities. Id. § 2-105.
13D SIMPsoN, CONTRACTS 302-03 (2d ed. 1965).
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detriment on A's implied promise to keep the offer open.' Recovery
on such a theory has, however, been granted sparingly in commercial
transactions. Courts seem to require a showing that the person seek-
ing recovery expended time and expense in order to take advantage
of the offer ..2 or has abandoned an existing right. 33  It is doubtful
that recovery would be granted to the nontendering shareholder if his
only action was to delay a sale of his shares.3
Once a shareholder has tendered his shares under our prototype
case he probably cannot withdraw them until the tender offer period
has expired." Suppose, however, A's offer stated that A had no
obligation to purchase any shares if, in its judgment, such purchases
would be contrary to its best interests. If A's discretion in rejecting
the shares cannot be reviewed against objective standards, its offer
may be regarded as an invitation to deal and shares deposited under
such a tender offer may be withdrawn before they are purchased.'3 8
Similarly, if A's offer were a first-come, first-served offer, any shares
deposited after the first 390,000 shares have been deposited could be
withdrawn. In the pro rata tender offer shareholders may have
similar rights with respect to the part of their deposit which A is not
obligated to accept. 3  These conclusions suggest that perhaps A may
have an obligation to announce when the minimum number of shares
have been deposited under a first-come, first-served offer, and, in the
131 RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 90 (1932):
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee
and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
See also 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 191 (3d ed. 1957).
132 Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Security Stove & Mfg.
Co. v. American Ry. Express Co., 227 Mo. App. 175, 51 S.W.2d 572 (1932).
133 Trexler's Estate, 27 Pa. D. & C. 4 (1936); see RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§ 90, illustrations 1-4 (1932).
'34 Rennie & Laughlin, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 242 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1957);
Gill v. U.S. Rubber Co., 195 F. Supp. 837 (N.D. Ind. 1961); CoRBIN, CoNTRACTS
§200 (1963 ed.).
135 One problem for the maker of the tender offer is the point at which he must
file § 16(a) reports with respect to the shares tendered. Until the minimum number
of shares are tendered, he normally has only an option to purchase the shares
tendered. The rules for reporting options are discussed at note 68 supra. If any
of the shares tendered can be withdrawn, it is doubtful that a § 16(a) report must
be filed with respect to them. Once the minimum number of shares are tendered,
the offeror is normally obligated to purchase the number of shares specified in
the offer and is regarded at that time as having acquired a beneficial interest in such
number of shares for the purposes of § 16(a).
136 Nebraska Seed Co. v. Harsh, 98 Neb. 89, 152 N.W. 310 (1915); Moulton v.
Kershaw, 59 Wis. 316, 18 N.W. 172 (1884).
137 It may, however, be argued that A's obligation to take a part of the shares
tendered in a pro rata offer provides sufficient consideration to make irrevocable the
option granted to A with respect to those shares which it is not obligated to
purchase.
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case of a pro rata offer, to announce from time to time how many shares
over the minimum have been deposited.
IV
In this section of our article, we turn to the duty of B's manage-
ment to advise its shareholders about the desirability of accepting A's
tender offer. If management opposes the tender offer, it will so advise
shareholders and deluge them with reasons supporting its position.'
However, management frequently makes no comment on a tender offer
and leaves the decision whether or not to tender solely to the share-
holder. Although such management abstention is not possible in
connection with other acquisition forms such as the effectuation of a
merger or the sale of the assets of the corporation, a tender offer
appears to be viewed as a transaction between a shareholder and a
potential purchaser. It is not thought to involve a corporate interest
and therefore management has neither an interest nor a responsibility
with respect to the transaction. 8 9
This attitude was expressed in a case in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit " in which, prior to selling his
shares to a stranger to the corporation, the plaintiff asked the president
of the corporation to tell him what he thought the shares were worth.
The president refused and told the shareholder to make up his own
mind. The plaintiff sold his shares at $43.57 a share; shortly there-
after all the shares in the corporation were sold at $321 per share. The
court held that the president had not acted improperly by refusing to
give advice to the plaintiff. It reasoned that the president did not
stand in any fiduciary relationship to the plaintiff merely because he
knew of the impending sale.' 4 ' The court's conclusion that the president
did not owe the shareholder a duty to advise him about the price he
should ask for his shares appears to be proper where the shares sold do
not constitute a controlling block of shares. A contrary result might
imply that management would have to inform any stockholder who
asked for advice whether or not the market price for his shares at the
188 Management opposition to tender offers is discussed in pt. V infra.
139 See Mairs v. Madden, 307 Mass. 378, 30 N.E.2d 242 (1940); cf. Abelow v.
Midstates Oil Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 145, 151, 189 A.2d 675, 678 (Sup. Ct. 1963). Of
course, management may recommend acceptance of a tender offer. See Prospectus,
The Ruberoid Company, Sept. 12, 1966 (exchange offer of shares of The Ruberoid
Company for stock of American Felt Company).
140 Broffe v. Horton, 172 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1949).
141The court made it dear, however, that if plaintiff could show that the
president or his wife secretly purchased his stock by using the ostensible purchaser
to shield their identity, it would hold the president liable for failing to make affirma-
tive disclosures about the financial condition of the company. Id. at 494.
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time of any sale was fair. Such a burden should not be imposed in
the ordinary course of business.
It is not clear that this analysis should apply where a tender offer
for control is made. Such a transaction is unusual in the life of the
corporation and involves a significant percentage of its stockholders.
Moreover, the tender offer resembles the sale of the assets of the
corporation with some of the financing of that sale coming from shares
which are not purchased." Thus, it might be argued that some duty
of director comment should be imposed-at the least each director might
be required to disclose whether or not he plans to tender his shares. On
the other hand, the tender offer for control differs in important re-
spects from the acquisition of assets or merger situation. Acceptance
of the offer is entirely voluntary with the individual shareholder who
can make his own judgment about the investment merits of the offer.
In a merger or sale of assets transaction the board of directors
negotiates the deal for the shareholders and the individual shareholder
is bound by the vote of his fellow shareholders.
Significantly, neither the Commonwealth legislation nor the pro-
posed American legislation requires directors to comment on the terms
of a tender offer. The Ontario Securities Act proceeds from the
premise that directors do not have a duty to make comments, but that
if they decide to recommend for or against acceptance of the tender
offer the directors must supply certain information.143
Even if management is not required to give shareholders the
benefit of its judgment concerning the adequacy or fairness of a tender
offer, must it disclose any favorable material facts--such as a significant
142 See Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of
Shares, 78 HARv. L. REv. 505, 531-33 (1965); Leech, Transactions in Corporate
Control, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 725, 752 (1956).
143 Ontario Securities Act § 95. The Ontario Act requires the circular containing
the director's recommendation to include the following information:
1. The number of shares of the offeree company beneficially owned by
each director and executive officer;
2. The decision of each director and executive officer and 10% share-
holder with respect to tendering his shares;
3. The number of shares of the offeror company beneficially owned by
each director, executive officer and 10% shareholder;
4. Details of any arrangement made or proposed to be made between
the offeror company and the director or executive officer as to compensa-
tion for loss of office or as to their remaining in or retiring from office;
5. Details of any material contract with the offeror company to which
any director, executive officer or 10% shareholder is a party; and
6. Details of any material change in the financial position or prospects
of the offeree company since the date of the last published financial statements
of the company.
Ibid. The Australian Companies Act requires the directors either to recommend for
or against the merger or to state that they do "not desire to make a recommendation
or consider [themselves] not justified in making a recommendation.' Australia
Companies Act § 184(3), Tenth Schedule, pt. C, 1. See note 123 supra.
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firming of prices and increase in the backlog of orders for the corpora-
tion's products '--which might affect shareholder judgment with re-
spect to the desirability of accepting the tender offer? We have
already noted the holding of the Second Circuit that management need
not disclose favorable developments to an inquiring shareholder ex-
pressing a desire to sell.' 4" Although good practice among American
corporations dictates prompt disclosure of material information con-
cerning the corporation's business unless there are legitimate business
reasons for withholding the information, that practice is codified only
in the rules of the major exchanges and the National Association of
Securities Dealers.1 48 Failure to abide by such rules has not yet been
held to give rise to civil liability. 4 7 Courts may not be willing broadly
to impose a duty of prompt disclosure because it might involve them
in frequent review of management discretion over the timing of the
publication of corporate news and would raise extraordinarily complex
questions regarding the class of persons entitled to receive damages for a
breach of this duty. 48 On the other hand, courts have undertaken these
'44 See Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879
(1965).
145 See text accompanying note 140 supra.
146 ' Ew YORK STOcK EXCHANGE, COMPANY MANUAL A-20 to A-22; NATIONAL
Ass'N OF SECURITIS DEALERs, MANUAL G-54, 7 ("minimum standards" for inclu-
sion in an over-the-counter quotations list) ; American Stock Exchange, Listing Form
L, at 1, 5. The Commission requires the filing of reports which call for disclosure
of the details of certain corporate transactions, such as mergers or acquisitions,
after they occur. It may be contended that a failure to disclose material events as
required by these reports subjects a company to civil liability. See Fleischer,
"Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1146, 1157-1158
(1965).
Sometimes prompt disclosure can be a defensive tactic. When AMK Corpo-
ration made a tender offer for the shares of John Morrell & Company, Morrell
management accelerated the preparation of the earnings report for fiscal 1966 "in
order that all shareholders [could] have current information on the company's
operating results." Statement of W. W. McCallum, President of John Morrell &
Company, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1966, p. 49, col. 7. The report showed earnings
of $695,000 which compared favorably with the net loss of $344,667 shown in the
prior fiscal year. McCallum also reported that no officer or director of Morrell
intended to tender his stock.
147 Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
35 U.S.L. WEEK 3125 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1966). See also O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d
764 (2d Cir. 1964) (no violation under federal law) ; Gaynor v. Buckley, 318 F.2d
432 (9th Cir. 1963).
In his excellent article on implied rights of action, Professor Shipman points out
that in Colonial Realty the court carefully left open the possibility of implied rights
of action flowing from violations of those self-regulatory requirements which play
an integral part in SEC regulation. He concludes that "in its dictum-that there
is a possibility of implied rights without a showing of a violation of the act or Com-
mission rules-the opinion is a sophisticated groundbreaker." Shipman, Two Cur-
rent Questions Concerning Implied Private Rights of Action Under the Exchange
Act: Authority of the Administrative Agency to-Negate; Existence for Violation
of Self-Regulatory Requirements, 17 Wis. Rs. L. Rxv. 925, 963 (1966).
148Some of these problems are discussed in Painter, Inside Information:
Growing Pains for the Development of Federal Corporation Law Under Rule 10b-5,
65 CoLuu. L. Rv. 1361 (1965).
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tasks when the corporation or management engage in securities trans-
actions 149 or induce others to do so by affirmative representations."5
Courts might also be willing to intervene in cases involving a sig-
nificant market transaction such as a tender offer.'51 However, court
intervention here would extend its review to a situation where an
outsider controls the timing of the event which triggers management
liability for failure to disclose. Some protection against failure to
disclose exists in the Securities and Exchange Commission's power to
suspend the tender offer and trading in the security if it had reason to
believe material facts had not been disclosed. 5 At any rate, it would
149 Under federal law management's failure to disclose in these circumstances
is actionable because it occurs "in connection with the purchase or sale of any secu-
rity." See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
150 See Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964);
Freed v. Szabo Food Serv. Inc., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 91,317 (N. D. IIl. 1964).
Contra, Heit v. Weitzen, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 191,701 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 1966)
(allegedly false statements were designed to conceal overcharges to the govern-
ment). The court in Texas Gulf Sulphur stated that Rule lOb-5 may be violated
if the purpose of issuing a false and misleading press release is to affect the market
price of the company's stock to the advantage of the company or its insiders. 258
F. Supp. at 283-84.
See also SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7968 (Sept. 30, 1966) (injunction
sought by SEC against further distribution of an annual report of a company which
allegedly contained false and misleading statements). Early cases under Rule 10b-5
intimated that a defrauded person had a remedy only against the person from whom
he bought, or to whom he sold,, securities. See Fleischer, Securities Trading and
Corporate Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sudphur Pro-
ceeding, 51 VA. L. REv. 1271, 1293 n.111 (1965). However, a long series of cases
has held a cause of action lies under the Rule if there is a false statement and the
corporation or its management was executing securities transactions, even though
the plaintiff did not buy or sell securities from any of the alleged defrauders. See,
e.g., Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Gann v.
BernzOmatic Corp., CCH FE. SEc. L. REP. 1191,713 (S.D.N.Y.'July 15, 1966);
Barlas v. Bear, Sterns & Co., CCII FFD. SEc. L. REP. 1 91,674 (N. D. Ill. March 31,
1966); Rosen v. Bergman, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 91,659 (S.D.N.Y. March 21,
1966) ; Fischer v. Kletz, 249 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). State law may impose
liability when a company releases a report which it knows is misleading for dis-
semination to the general public and reliance on the statement by investors is in-
tended. See Prosser, Misrepresentations and Third Persons, 19 VAND. L. R-v. 231,
243-45 (1966).
151 Commentators have increasingly argued that courts may be willing to find
liability for nondisclosure in certain situations even though there has been no secu-
rities trading by the corporation or management and there have been no false or
misleading statements. See Symposium, Insider Trading in Stocks, 21 Bus. LAw.
1009, 1025 (1966) (statement of T. A. Halleran).
The former head of the SEC's Special Study of Securities Markets has stated:
[Ilt would require no great extension of existing trends to read the rule
[10b-5] as providing a general sanction for an issuer's failure to disclose
where previous disclosures have become materially misleading--creating a
general obligation to make whatever material disclosures are necessary (but
not otherwise affirmatively required) to maintain the current accuracy of a
registrant's continuous disclosure file.
Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1340, 1366 (1966).
152Securities Exchange Act §15(c)(5), 78 Stat. 574 (1964), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(c) (5) (1964); § 19(a) (4), 48 Stat. 898 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a) (4) (1963).
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be appropriate for a court to inquire whether disclosure of all material
facts has been made in those cases where management has received
some reward for its acquiescence in the tender offer .
5 3
If the material facts which management fails to disclose indicate
an unfavorable turn in the financial condition of the corporation, the
shareholders who tender their shares will benefit at the expense of the
maker of the tender offer. To the extent that the duty to disclose
arises from a concept of the fiduciary relationship of management to
its shareholders, it may be argued that even the limited rights available
to B shareholders against B management for its failure to disclose are
not available to A. However, federal law does not seem to distinguish
between sellers and buyers of securities-between those who are share-
holders and those who are becoming shareholders. 54 In any event,
management's tender of its own shares will probably trigger its duty
of disclosure. 55
Although failure to disclose under these circumstances would
permit A to rescind its purchase of management stock, its purchases
of stock from other B shareholders could not normally be rescinded.
Suppose, however, that in our prototype case 390,000 shares had been
tendered, of which 30,000 were management shares. A would argue
that it is not obligated to buy any of the shares tendered because only
360,000 of the 390,000 shares required by the offer have been tendered.
Since the 30,000 shares of management stock have been deposited in
violation of Rule lOb-5, the deposit should, according to this argument,
be regarded as void under section 29 of the Securities Exchange Act.'
It would urge that B shareholders are the proper persons to bear the
risk of loss resulting from unfavorable occurrences to the enterprise of
which they are the owners. 57 On the other hand, B shareholders
15 3 If this situation is analyzed as involving a breach of management's fiduciary
obligation, suit could be brought under state law and a showing that the failure
to disclose occurred "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" would
be unnecessary.
1
5 4 Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 913-14 (1961); see Symposium, Duties
and Liabilities of Corporate Directors, 22 Bus. LAw. 29, 133 (1966).
155 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
It may be argued that, where A makes an unsolicited offer to buy, it should be
forced to take B "as is." See Hafner v. Forest Labs., Inc., 345 F.2d 167 (2d Cir.
1965); Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Ohio 1959). The assumption
in these cases appears to be that the purchaser in this situation relies on his own
expertise and consequently is not entitled to the same protection as the unsophisticated
investor who buys in the market. However, it seems that both the purchaser in the
market and the maker of a tender offer rely on management's having fulfilled its
duty of disclosure.
15648 Stat. 903 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 78cc (1964). Cf. Polakoff v.
Delaware Steeplechase & Race Ass'n., 254 F. Supp. 574 (D. Del. 1966) (stock ac-
quired in violation of Rule 10b-5 not regarded as legally owned for determining
requisite stock ownership for a "short-form" merger).
157 In other words if the proper disclosure had been made there would have
been a fall in the market price of the stock and the tender offer would have been
made at a lower price.
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would argue that 390,000 shares have been tendered, but that manage-
ment's breach of duty merely excused A from having to buy more than
360,000 shares.15 Acceptance of this argument would not make the
determination of who, between A and the B shareholders, should bear
the risk of loss, turn on the decision of management to tender its
shares.'5 It would make A look to B management for damages to
compensate it for the loss suffered in the purchase of the shares. How-
ever, case law has not yet developed to the point where it can be
confidently asserted that B management's failure to disclose in con-
nection with its sale of 30,000 shares will make it liable for damages
incurred in connection with the purchase of more than ten times the
number of shares they sold. This issue was left open for later decision
in the Texas Gulf Sulphur opinion." °
In its efforts to enlist the cooperation of B management, A might
make various promises to the management-long-term employment
contracts, raises in salary-whose fulfillment is conditioned on the
success of the tender offer. If such arrangements are negotiated as a
sine qua non for management's acquiescence in the tender offer, they
are probably improper." 1 The more difficult question concerns the
need to disclose the existence and details of arrangements made for
the future employment of management where these arrangements do
not constitute a condition of management's acquiescence in the tender
offer. Although such arrangements might be proper, the suspicion
158 A's purpose in making the tender offer presumably can only be accom-
plished if it can buy the minimum number of shares tendered. As a consequence A
may have to buy B management's shares at the inflated price.
159 If A purchases the 390,000 shares tendered and later discovers the material,
undisclosed fact, the policy of not disturbing completed commercial transactions would
be another reason for a court not to permit rescission of the purchases from B
shareholders other than management.
160 If the function of civil liability under Rule 10b-5 is compensatory, it is diffi-
cult to find a rational basis for limiting management's liability to the damages
suffered on the 30,000 shares it sold. See Painter, supra note 148. It has been
argued that the primary purpose of imposing civil liability under Rule lob-5 in
cases involving the failure to disclose inside information is one of deterrence. Such
an argument would limit management's liability to the forfeiture of any profits it
made as a consequence of its failure to disclose. See Mundheim, The Texas Gulf
Sulphur Complaint, 1966 J. Bus. L. 284, 290-91. This appears to have been the
Commission's theory in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case, in which it limited its re-
quest for relief to an order requesting defendants to offer rescission with respect
to the shares they purchased or whose purchase they stimulated.
On the other hand, if A purchased the B shares in reliance on false or mis-
leading reports filed by B with the Commission or distributed to its shareholders, A
may have an action in damages against B with respect to all of the shares acquired.
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 18, 48 Stat 897, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1964);
cases cited note 150 supra.
161 See LATTIN, CORPORATIONS 261 (1959); Nielson, Directors' Duties Under
Anglo-Anwrican Corporation Law, 43 U. Dxr. L.. 605, 649-55 (1966).
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lingers that they may have influenced management's judgment about
the tender offer. If management affirmatively recommends acceptance
of the tender offer, any arrangements made with management should
probably be disclosed.162 It would also seem prudent to disclose any
arrangements 163 made when management remains neutral. Such dis-
closure could be made in A's Offering Letter.'"
Management's general fiduciary responsibilities prohibit it from
taking advantage of a tender offer at the expense of its shareholders.
For example, management cannot buy shares in the market in antici-
pation of reselling them under a planned tender offer of which it has
been informed." 5 Nor can management persuade the maker of a
tender offer to buy its shares secretly at a price higher than that offered
shareholders in the tender offer. 6' Finally, as noted previously,
management may not recommend acceptance of one tender offer without
disclosing a pending higher offer of which it has knowledge.
67
162 See Complaint, SEC v. Skagit Valley Tel. Co., Civil No. 286, W.D. Wash.,
Dec. 9, 1965. The Commission charged a violation of Rule lob-5 where directors
who recommended acceptance of an offer of $300 per share failed to disclose the
grant to them of stock options and continuing employment at an increased salary by
the maker of the tender offer. But see Seagrave Corp. v. Mount, 212 F.2d 389,
395-96 (6th Cir. 1954).
The Commonwealth legislation imposes a similar duty of disclosure. Australia
Companies Act, Tenth Schedule, pt. C, 2(d) ; British Dealers Rules, First Schedule,
pt. II, 1(6) ; Ontario Securities Act § 95(4).
1
63 In many cases there are only vague understandings with respect to the future
position of incumbent management.
164 Compare note 143 supra.
165 See Hughes & Treat, 22 S.E.C. 623, 626 (1946) (dictum). See also SEC v.
Gentile, SEC Litigation Release No. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1946) (defendant purchased
minority stockholders' shares without informing them of a right to sell their shares
at higher prices); Reed v. Riddle Airline, 266 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1959) (dictum)
(improper for insider to purchase stock without disclosing that outsider, a well-known
financier, had evidenced interest in purchasing large blocks of stock) ; cf. R. D. Bayly
& Co., 19 S.E.C. 773, 784 (1945); BAYER & CARY, CAsEs oN CORPORATIONS 590-94
(1959) (discussion of state law cases).
Query whether a brokerage firm which has a representative on the board of
directors of the offeree corporation can properly act as the broker for the offeror
in its purchases in the market place prior to making the tender offer.
Serious questions arise if the management of the offeror, having been advised
in advance of a first-come, first-served tender offer, deposits its shares before all the
shareholders have an adequate opportunity to do so.
166 Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. Rxv. 725, 750-58,
769-73 (1956).
167 SEC v. Fruit of the Loom, Inc., Civ. No. 61-640, S.D.N.Y., 1961, reported
in 27 SEC ANN. REP. 92-93 (1961); Complaint, SEC v. Skagit Valley Tel. Co.,
Civ. No. 286, W.D. Wash., Dec. 9, 1965.
A tender of stock by controlling persons or of stock subject to investment re-
strictions may be in violation of the Securities Act of 1933 unless the offeror
acquires the stock for investment. As long as the offeror is attempting to secure
a controlling block it may he assumed it has an investment intention. 'In any event,
a resale of such stock could subject the offeror to liability as an "underwriter."
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V
In an earlier section of this article we described various steps which
management might take if it opposed acceptance of a tender offer.'
In this section, we shall analyze the legal problems which arise in con-
nection with specific defensive tactics.
Management's minimum response to a tender offer it opposes will
be an advertisement or letter voicing its opposition and spelling out
reasons for not tendering. When Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas
offered to purchase 350,000 shares of common stock of Columbia
Pictures Corporation, management published an advertisement designed
to bring "certain facts" to the attention of Columbia stockholders.'6
The advertisement pointed out that no Columbia director was tendering
his shares; that if the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas was willing to
offer $33 per share, it must think the stock is worth much more; that
the market value of one Columbia subsidiary alone was the equivalent
of $31.75 per share of Columbia stock outstanding; that Columbia's
film library and real estate holdings had materially increased in value;
that the transaction was taxable; and that the advice of brokers and
dealers to tender should be viewed in the light of the fifty cent com-
mission payable to them for each share whose tender they could
procure.70  Many of these themes appear periodically in management
literature opposing tender offers.1
7 '
Assume that B management issued a statement suggesting that
the price per share offered in A's tender offer was inadequate and that
some of the facts presented to demonstrate the inadequacy of the price
were false or misleading. If the false or misleading facts are material,
the Commission could probably secure an injunction against dissemina-
tion of the statement and obtain an order requiring publication of cor-
recting literature. The Commission's action would be premised on
the theory that the statement is reasonably calculated to affect the
decision of buyers or sellers of B shares and thus is made in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security.'" As a practical matter, how-
ever, it is unlikely that the Commission would seek an injunction except
168 See text accompanying notes 18-25 mipra.
169 N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1966, p. 67, col. 2.
170 The advertisement also urged shareholders not to tender before the last day
of the offering period. It argued that tender prior to that date gives a "free option"
to the Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas for the balance of the offering period and
possibly beyond that date.
171 See, e.g., Letter From President of Julius Garfinckel & Company, March 11,
1966 (comments on tender offer by Genesco, Inc.); Wall Street Journal, Feb. 14,
1966, p. 28, col. 1 (comments by management of Northwestern National Insurance
on tender offer of Seaboard Western Investing Corporationy.
172 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7968 (Sept. 30, 1966).
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in a flagrant case. The Commission does not have the manpower to go
to court to remedy every misstatement made. It is probably most re-
luctant to intervene in a contested situation in which there is oppor-
tunity for each side to correct the material issued by the other side.
173
If the Commission does not intervene, A may have difficulty
securing relief under federal law against the statements issued by
B management. We have found no case granting a person in A's
position a remedy. Courts have almost uniformly construed the
language in Rule 10b-5 that forbids any act, practice or course of
business which operates as a fraud upon any person, "in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security," to require that the plaintiff
in a Rule lOb-5 case must have purchased or sold a security.174 Because
of this requirement, a recent case held that a corporation which was
the object of a bid for control could not secure an injunction under
Rule 10b-5 against allegedly false statements of the persons making
the bid.'75 In only one case has a court recognized that the plaintiff
has a cause of action when he is dissuaded from selling by the de-
fendant's false representations-these representations interfered with
the plaintiff's investment decision-making process."" Even in that
case, however, the plaintiff eventually sold his stock-at a lower price
than he would have received had he sold the stock when he first tried
173 For a statement of the Commission position during a proxy contest, see von
Mehren & McCarrol, The Proxy Rules: A Case Study in the Administrative Proc-
ess, 29 LAw & CoNTxMP. PROB. 728, 732-35 (1964).
174 Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 956 (1952); Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213, 222-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
175 Studebaker Corp. v. Allied Prods. Corp., 256 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Mich,
1966) ; cf. Polakoff v. Delaware Steeplechase & Race Ass'n, 254 F. Supp. 574 (D. Del.
1966); Defiance Indus., Inc. v. Galdi, 256 F. Supp. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
17GStockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Contra,
Keers & Co. v. American Steel & Pump Corp., 234 F. Supp. 201 (S.D.N.Y 1964).
In Fudge & Semenza, 30 S.E.C. 334 (1949), a group of brokers persuaded other
persons not to bid at a delinquent assessment sale, thus permitting purchase of the
stock at a fraction of its value. The Commission found that the brokers' conduct
violated Rule lOb-S. In McManus v. Jessup & Moore Paper Co., 5 S.E.C. Judicial
Decisions 810 (E.D. Pa. 1948), the court denied a motion to dismiss the complaint
of an "aborted seller." However, it did so without opinion. For other cases in which
Rule lob-5 has been held to be violated even though there were no executed securi-
ties transactions, see M. L. Lee & Co. v. American Cardboard & Packaging Corp., 36
F.R.D. 27 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (alleged fraudulent course of conduct by prospective under-
writer preventing underwriting) ; Investment Service Co., SEC Exchange Act Release
No. 6884 (Aug. 15, 1962), aff'd sub nom. Barnett v. United States, 319 F.2d 340
(8th Cir. 1963) (failure of a brokerage firm to execute a brokerage order under
circumstances involving a breach of fiduciary obligation). The implications of these
cases may be that the B shareholders who are dissuaded from selling by the mis-
representations of B have an action against it, at least where their shares are subse-
quently sold at a loss.
State law cases have permitted recovery to persons who were induced not to
act by another's fraudulent misrepresentations. See, e.g., Continental Ins. Co. v.
Mercadante, 222 App. Div. 181, 225 N.Y. Supp. 488 (1927) (defendant induced
plaintiff to retain his bond holdings by false representations relating to the financial
condition of the corporation).
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to do so. A's case is more difficult than the abortive seller case because
the misleading statements do not interfere with its investment decision-
making process. A, in effect, seeks to vindicate the rights of B share-
holders, who, it claims, were dissuaded by the false representations from
tendering their shares.'
7 7
At the same time there are inferences which can be drawn from
recent cases supporting A's efforts to secure injunctive relief. In
J. I. Case Co. v. Borak,7 8 the Supreme Court showed little patience
with procedural limitations which interfered with a vindication of sub-
stantive rights under the securities law and ordered the federal courts
to fashion an appropriate federal remedy for a violation of the
proxy rules. 79 The easiest cases for a court to grant relief occur where
A merely requests an injunction and does not claim damages or seek
to unravel a completed transaction.""0 Recently the Second Circuit in
Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin 181 held that a corporation had standing
to seek an injunction against the use by the defendant of written
authorizations, allegedly obtained in violation of the proxy rules, to
inspect the corporation's list of stockholders.'8 The court found that
177 1n general, federal courts have not been sympathetic to such an argument.
See Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 252 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Kremer v.
Selheimer, 215 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
The kind of argument A must make may find some precedent in Voege v. Amer-
ican Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965). In that case de-
fendant made a tender offer for shares of the corporation in which plaintiff was a
shareholder. After the completion of the tender offer, defendant held more than 90%
of the shares of the corporation. It then caused the corporation to merge with it
under the Delaware short-form merger provision. Under the terms of the merger,
plaintiff and other minority shareholders were paid $17 per share for their holdings-
the same price as that paid under the tender offer. The plaintiff sought relief under
Rule 10b-5 on the allegation that statements in the tender offer were false and mis-
leading. The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. The plaintiff's best
argument was that these false and misleading statements deceived other shareholders
into tendering their shares and thus made possible the short-form merger which
forced the sale of her shares. In other words, the success of the deception on the
other shareholders resulted in damage to the plaintiff. The plaintiff's case in Voege
was easier than A's case because plaintiff "sold" her shares-in the sense that the
merger resulted in the disposition by the plaintiff of her shares. Voege is also
distinguishable because even though plaintiff was not directly deceived into selling
her shares at $17 per share, the court purported to find deception, "for when she
acquired her stock she did so upon the justifiable assumption that any merger
would deal with her fairly, only later to find, according to the complaint, that the
terms of the merger were designed to defraud her." Id. at 374.
178 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
179 Cf. Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363 (1966). In Pettit v. Ameri-
can Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), the court permitted the corporation
to sue on behalf of its "extremely large and scattered" stockholders. It thought that
the corporation provided a convenient vehicle for circumventing the serious practical
difficulties inherent in making each defrauded shareholder pursue his own remedy.
180 Cf. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
-18 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966).
182The authorizations came from shareholders holding more than 5% of the
corporation's stock. Section 1315 of the New York Business Corporation Law per-
mits a shareholder who has authorization in writing from holders of more than 5%
of any class of the outstanding shares to demand inspection of the corporation's share-
holders list.
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the corporation had an interest in seeing that the contest for control
of which it was the object was fought within the principles laid down
under the proxy rules. In the case under discussion A has an interest
in seeing that the B management's statements do not contravene the
prohibitions of Rule lOb-5 because such statements are reasonably
calculated to affect the sale of shares to it.183
In the last part of its opinion, the Gittlin courf held that a private
person may bring an action solely to vindicate the policies of the
Securities Exchange Act.'8' The plaintiff corporation charged that
the material used to solicit the stockholder authorizations did not con-
tain all the information required to be contained in a proxy statement
and had not been filed with the Commission in accordance with the
provisions of Rule 14a-6.'I There was no charge that the statements
contained in the soliciting material were false or misleading or that
any of the persons who gave their authorization were misled into doing
so. The court granted the injunction on the theory that in this case
the plaintiff corporation stood in the shoes of the Commission. It
made the judgment that "the public interest in enforcing the Proxy
Rules outweighed any inconvenience to [the defendant] in having to
start again." 1"6
Since A's problem in getting a remedy under Rule lOb-5 against
B management's misstatements relates primarily to its inability to
show that it has been deceived in connection with the purchase or sale
of a security, it may be more successful seeking relief under state tort
concepts. Tort law recognizes that economic relations are entitled to
protection against unreasonable interference. 8 7  For example, malicious
circulation of the false statement that X has gone out of business-thus
depriving him of customers-is actionable."s  However, the cases in
18
3 A might also sue derivatively on behalf of B to enjoin the directors from
interfering unfairly with its attempt to gain control of B. Such action was taken in
Michigan Gas Utils. Co. v. Michigan Gas & Elec. Co., Nos. 198-66 & 199-66, St
Joseph (Mich.) County Cir. Ct, 1966. Although the Gittlin court stated that a
corporation did not have to remain aloof during a proxy contest for control, it sug-
gested that when the corporation departed from its normal position of neutrality it
should do so only at the behest of management and not be forced to do so in a deriva-
tive action. The court saw a special role for management in protecting the corporation
from attempts by "irresponsible outsiders" to take control.
Under the SEC's proposed amendments to the Williams Bill, it would be unlawful
for any person to make misleading statements or misleading omissions in connection
with a tender offer. SEC Memorandum on S. 2731, § 14(d) (6). Presumably this
provision would give rise to private rights of action for damages or an injunction to
anyone, such as A, who can demonstrate that he was damaged by a violation.
184 360 F.2d at 698.
185 17 C.F.L § 240.14a-6 (1964).
186 360 F.2d at 698.
187 PROSSER, TORTS 938 (3d ed. 1964); Halpern, Intentional Torts and the
Restatement, 7 BUFFALO L. Rxv. 7 (1957); see Defiance Indus., Inc. v. Galdi, 256
F. Supp. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
188 Ratcliffe v. Evans, [1892] Q.B. 524; PROSSE, op. cit. supra note 187, at 939.
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which relief has been granted normally involve some direct disparage-
ment of the plaintiff's property, business or person. This would
perhaps be the case if the B management characterized A as a "raider"
which planned to loot the corporation. B's management, however, wil
generally discourage acceptance of A's offer by "puffing" the value of
B stock." 9 In addition, it will probably be necessary for A to prove
that B management deliberately lied in making the false statements.'"
Another device which B management might use to combat A's
tender offer is to have B purchase B stock in the market. Such pur-
chases will dry up the supply of B stock which might be tendered. In
addition, the buying demand will tend to drive the price of shares up
and thus make the tender offer look less attractive."
Although there seems to be no question that corporations in the
United States can purchase their own stock, questions do arise under
state law concerning the propriety of corporate purchase of its own
stock during a contest for control. A series of Delaware cases 1'2 has
justified such corporate purchases on the theory that "a threat to control
by an 'outsider' poses a question of 'corporate policy' in terms of
conflicting views as between management and a large 'outsider' interest
as to how the business should be conducted." 'o In one Delaware
case which did not sanction corporate purchases of its own stock,
management acted so hastily in causing the corporate purchases to be
made that it did not have time to find out whether or not purchase
by the outside interest involved "any real threat to corporate policy." -o4
The case was thus presented as a use of corporate funds to preserve
the control of the incumbents-a practice condemned in a number of
judicial opinions.1 5 The difficulty is that most contests for control
189 Courts have been reluctant to find liability in common law cases where a seller
of goods makes consciously exaggerated claims for his own products. Id. at 949-50.
'L0 Id. at 944-45.
191 If management does not control a large position in the B stock, purchases of
B stock by B will help A by reducing the number of shares it must purchase to gain
control. In that case B management's purposes will be served if it can persuade
interests friendly to it to purchase B stock.
19 'Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964); Kors v. Carey, 39
Del. Ch. 47, 158 A.2d 136 (1960); Martin v- American Potash & Chem. Corp., 33
Del. Ch. 234, 92 A.2d 295 (1952). Accord, Iendricks v. Mill Eng'r & Supply Co.,
- Wash. -, 413 P.2d 811 (1966).
193 Israels, Corporate Purchase of Its O=n Shares-Are There New Overtones?,
50 CORNELL L.Q. 620, 623 (1965). The issue of the propriety of management's using
corporate funds to defend its position also arises in proxy contests. Compare Rosen-
feld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955), with
Lawyer's Advertising Co. v. Consolidated Ry. Lighting & Refrigerating Co., 187
N.Y. 395, 80 N.E. 199 (1907). See Note, Buying Out Insurgent Shareholders With
Corporate Funds, 70 YALE L.J. 308 (1960).
194 Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (1962).
'95 Anderson v. Albert & J. M. Anderson Mfg. Co., 325 Mass. 343, 90 N.E.2d
54i (1950); see Note, Buying Out Insurgent Shareholders With Corporate Funds,
70 YALE L.J. 308, 316 (1960); cf. Lawyer's Advertising Co. v. Consolidated Ry.
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can be dressed up as involving a conflict of policy. In addition, share-
holders are, in effect, deprived of a choice between the conflicting
policies and personalities when corporate funds can be used to purchase
enough shares to make it impossible for the outsider to gain the
control he seeks. For both reasons, the legal literature has been very
critical of the Delaware line of authority.'
The development under federal law of doctrines different from
those evolving in the states does not find support in decided cases. In
a number of cases a plaintiff, suing derivatively in a Rule lOb-5 action,
has alleged that management caused the corporation to purchase shares
solely in order to preserve its control. Courts have consistently ruled
that such allegations do not state a cause of action under Rule 10b-5.'1
9 7
These rulings are based, in part, on the courts' failure to find any
deception with respect to the value of the shares bought.' On the
other hand, if management caused the corporation to purchase shares
at too high a price by withholding information from the board of
directors (or possibly the shareholders) which indicates that the stock
is overvalued, a cause of action under Rule 10b-5 on behalf of the
corporation would seem to lie.'
Instead of buying up shares in the market, management might
cause the corporation to issue stock at market to persons who will be
Lighting & Refrigerating Co., 187 N.Y. 395, 80 N.E. 199 (1907). But see Lawrence
v. Decca Records, Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 424, 195 N.Y.S.2d 431 (Sup. Ct 1959) (complaint
alleging use of corporate funds to buy stock at market to cement control of incumbents
not actionable in the absence of an allegation of damage to the corporation).
196Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?, 22 Bus. LAw. 35, 61-62 (1966); Note,
Buying Out Insurgent Shareholders With Corporate Funds, 70 YAL.E L.J. 308 (1960);
Note, 1965 DuxE L.J. 412, 415-16.
19 7 O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964) (purchases at price above the
market); Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213, 227-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (purchases by
the corporation at prices alleged to be fraudulently depressed); cf. Carliner v. Fair
Lanes,. Inc., 244 F. Supp. 25 (D. Md. 1965).
In O'Neill v. Maytag, supra, the court rejected the SEC's position that a claim
under Rule 10b-5 is stated by allegations that a corporation's "controlling directors
caused it to acquire a large block of its own stock at an excessive price for the purpose
of removing the threat to the directors' control represented by the stock." 339 F.2d
at 768.
298 See Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HAxv. L. REv.
1146, 1165-66 (1965). It is not clear what action a court would take if the failure
to disclose resulted in both management and shareholders not being aware of the
rights the corporation might have under state law with respect to the transaction.
See the discussion of Barnett v. Anaconda, Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp. and O'Neill v.
Maytag in Comment, Shareholders' Derivative Suit To Enforce a Corporate Right of
Action Against Directors Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 114 U. PA.. L. REV. 578 (1966).
199 Cf. Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
If B acquires shares in the market at a time when it has not disclosed material
information, its purchases may be viewed as violating Rule 10b-5. See Kennedy,
Transactions by a Corporation in Its Own Shares, 19 Bus. LAw. 319 (1964). If the
only undisclosed information is B management's purpose to maintain control through
the open-market purchases, it is not clear that a cause of action lies under the Rule
since arguably the existence of such a purpose may not be viewed as the kind of
information which affects the value of the stock purchased. See Fleischer, "Federal
Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1146, 1166 (1965),
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friendly to management. Although such a device is the exact converse
of the buy-up it seems to present greater difficulties. Several cases
have dealt with this technique of preserving control and condemned
it."00 Although the reasoning of the Delaware cases discussed previ-
ously suggests that these cases need not be followed if management can
show that the issuance was necessary to prevent control being achieved
by an outsider who wished to implement policies inimical to the
welfare of the corporation, courts which are troubled by the critiques
of these cases may find it easier to abide by the precedents in the issu-
ance of stock cases. There are additional reasons for not following the
rationale of Delaware buy-up cases in the stock issuance cases. In
the buy-up situation posited above,201 each shareholder has an equal
opportunity to sell his shares to the corporation through the market; 
202
but in the stock issuance case certain specially chosen people are
favored with the opportunity to buy the stock. This distinction is
particularly important because the issue of stock may be made at a
time when it is difficult to place much confidence in the market value
of the shares. Suppose in our prototype case, B stock was selling at
$23 per share on the American Stock Exchange fourteen days prior
to the end of the tender offer period. A court might be troubled if
B issued 100,000 shares of stock to close associates of management
at $23 per share.
Federal law provides remedies for the issuance of stock to preserve
management control if B management causes the stock to be issued
at below market price or at too low a price considering financial in-
formation withheld from the market.2°3 As indicated earlier, no federal
cause of action appears to arise where the stock is issued at fair value.
2
04
20 Schwab v. Schwab-Wilson Mach. Corp., 13 Cal. App. 2d 1 55 P.2d 1268
(1936) ; Macht v. Merchants Mortgage & Credit Co., 22 Del. Ch. 74, 194 Atl. 19
(1937) ; Ross Transport, Inc. v. Crothers, 185 Md. 573, 45 A.2d 267 (1946) ; Elliott
v. Baker, 194 Mass. 518, 80 N.E. 450 (1907); Luther v. C. J. Luther Co., 118 Wis.
112, 94 N.W. 69 (1903) ; BAKER & CARY, CAsEs oN CoaPoRATions 912-13 (1959).
201 See text accompanying note 191 supra.
202 All three of the Delaware cases cited in note 192 supra involve the purchase
of a large block of shares from the dissident group.
203 See Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964). There is some
question about the availability of a federal cause of action when the entire board of
directors participates in the transaction. Compare O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F2d 764,
767-69 (2d Cir. 1964), and Elfenbein v. Yaeger, CCH Fan. SEc. L. REP. 91,368
(S.D.N.Y. 1964), with Heilbrunn v. Hanover Equities Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
91,706 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 1966) (a corporation, in issuing its stock, may be de-
frauded by all of its directors and is not barred from relief by notions of imputed
knowledge). If management acquired shares in exchange for assets with an inflated
value, the corporation presumably would have a cause of action under Rule lob-5.
See Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F..d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 814 (1961); Simon v. The New Haven Board & Carton Co., 250 F. Supp.
297 (D. Conn. 1966).
20 See text accompanying note 197 supra.
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One of the consequences of a program for corporate purchases of
its own stock is raising the price of the stock." This result which, as
indicated earlier, may be an important element in defeating the tender
offer, can be accomplished in other ways. Management itself, or
interests friendly to it, may purchase stock in the market. The price
of the stock may also be boosted if management announces an in-
creased dividend. If these techniques are successful in defeating the
tender offer, the withdrawal of the tender offer and the withdrawal
of the buying pressure created by management may result in a drop in
the price of B shares. Similarly, failure to continue to maintain the
new dividend level may result in a price drop. The problem presented
by these situations concerns the remedies, if any, available to persons
who purchased B stock at the "inflated" prices, or to persons who
were dissuaded by these "inflated" prices from tendering their shares," 6
or to A, the success of whose offer may be adversely affected.
If, for example, a purchaser of B stock at an "inflated" price can
prove that the dividend was raised solely to create a rise in the price
of B shares, he probably would be able to recover damages from B
management. 207  On the other hand, if the directors can justify the
dividend action as serving some corporate purpose (i.e., that the
financial condition of the corporation warranted the establishment and
maintenance of a higher dividend pay-out), the fact that the increased
dividend had an impact on the price of the stock will probably be irrele-
vant. Questions of fact, then, present the primary issue in these cases,
with the problem of who has the burden of proof a key factor in deter-
mining their outcome.
The recent consent judgment against Georgia Pacific Corpora-
tion 208 and the undertaking given to the SEC by Genesco, Inc. suggest
205 With certain limited exceptions, B could not bid for or purchase any of its
shares if it were engaged in a "distribution" subject to Rule 10b-6 of the Securities
Exchange Act. This Rule embraces not only the conventional underwriting of shares
for cash, but, in the opinion of the staff of the Commission, may be operative in other
situations where a corporation is issuing, or proposing to issue, securities, such as
where it has a convertible security outstanding or has reached an agreement in prin-
ciple to acquire another company for its stock.
2 We have already discussed some of the difficulties of recovering under federal
and state law faced by persons who do not purchase or sell their securities. See text
accompanying notes 174-77 supra. The most appealing case in this category may be
presented by those persons who tendered their shares, but whose shares were not
taken up by A because the minimum number of shares was not tendered.
07See Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). In that
case the court refused to dismiss a complaint which alleged that defendants caused a
corporation whose shares they planned to purchase to reduce its quarterly dividend
for the purpose of depressing the price of its shares and thereby facilitating defendant's
purchase program. See Collins v. United States, 157 F.2d 409, 410 (9th Cir. 1946) ;
Gob Shops of America, Inc., 39 S.E.C. 92, 103 (1959); Coronado Dev. Corp. v.
Millikin, 175 Misc. 1, 22 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
208 SEC v. Georgia Pac. Corp., CCH Fim. Sc, L. Rvp. f[ 91,692 (S.D.N.Y,
May 24, 1966).
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that the manner in which management-inspired purchases of B stock
are effected may be very relevant in determining whether or not these
purchases violated the anti-manipulative provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act.09 Although the purchases may have the effect of driv-
ing up the price of the B stock, the existence of a manipulative purpose
may be difficult to establish if the purchases are made in a manner con-
sistent with buying the stock at the lowest possible price. The Genesco
undertakings suggest a procedure for purchasing stock in such a
manner. This procedure includes placing limitations on bids placed
prior to the opening of the market, not purchasing at prices in excess
of the last sales price or highest independent bid price, limiting the
volume of purchases on a daily and weekly basis and effecting all
purchases on any one day through one broker.210
B management may also oppose A's tender offer by arranging
a merger between B and a third corporation.- Effectuation of such a
merger normally requires solicitation of proxies to secure the necessary
shareholder approval. The material which A distributes to induce the
tender of shares is reasonably calculated to result in the withholding
of proxies from B management.211 Nevertheless, this fact alone will
not subject A's soliciting material to the Commission's proxy rules.
Even if A seeks proxies in connection with the tender of shares, it
seems that his soliciting material should not necessarily be subject to
the proxy rules-that is, if the proxies are solicited with respect to
shares of which A can be considered the beneficial owner. 12 Difficult
209 Section 9(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act prohibits a series of trans-
actions creating actual or apparent active trading in a security, or raising or depressing
the price of the security, for the purpose of inducing its purchase or sale by others.
The knowledge of a person that his purchase will affect the market price of the stock
does not make his actions unlawful. "However, when purchasing is done under such
circumstances that it must be expected to, and does, raise the price, and where the
purpose of such purchasing is to induce others to purchase--presumably at the higher
levels thus created-the statutory elements are present, and a violation of the Act is
involved." SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-3056 (Oct. 27, 1941). The manage-
ment-inspired purchases of B stock would not be for the purpose of inducing others
to purchase; their purpose is to induce B shareholders not to tender by maintaining
the price of B stock above the tender price. It is not clear whether this latter purpose
is covered by § 9. Rule 10b-5 under the Securities Exchange Act, which is captioned
"Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices," makes it unlawful "to employ
any device, scheme or artifice to defraud" or "to engage in any act, practice, or course
of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person."
It is not clear whether standards of manipulative conduct different from those contained
in § 9 are applicable under Rule 10b-5. These provisions are often cited together.
See, e.g., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-3056 (Oct. 27, 1941). For a discussion
of the anti-manipulative provision generally, see 3 Loss ch. 10A.210 Prospectus, Genesco, Inc., May 10, 1966, pp. 21-23.
211A proxy solicitation is defined to include the furnishing of a communication
to security holders under "circumstances reasonably calculated to result in the pro-
curement, withholding or revocation of a proxy." SEC Rule 14a-1 (f) (iii), 17 C.F.R.
§240.14a-1(f) (iii) (1964).
212Rule 14a-2 (c) exempts from the solicitations to which the proxy rules apply,
"any solicitation by a person in respect of securities of which he is the beneficial
owner." 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-2(c) (1964). See Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp.
753, 768 (D.N.J. 1955) ; text accompanying note 220 infra.
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questions concerning the need to comply with the proxy rules occur
when A's soliciting material seeks not only to induce the tender of
shares but also directly attacks the proposed merger. At some point-
and it is difficult to define that point abstractly-material soliciting
tenders of shares which also attacks the proposed merger may be
construed by the SEC staff as a proxy solicitation. 13
An additional set of problems arise if the vote on the merger
occurs before the tender offer expires. Can A vote the shares tendered
against the merger? If the shares are tendered without proxies being
attached, it is doubtful that A can vote them unless he is firmly ob-
ligated to purchase the shares. 214  Even if the B shares are tendered
with proxies, these proxies can normally be revoked if they are not
specifically stated to be irrevocable. However, if the proxies state
that they are irrevocable, B shareholders cannot revoke them under
state law if they are coupled with a sufficient interest to support the
promise of irrevocability. 2 5 A sufficient interest exists where A is
firmly obligated to purchase the shares-for example, where 390,000
shares have been tendered in a first-come, first-served offer.21 It prob-
ably exists where A is obligated to purchase the shares subject to a
condition subsequent over whose occurrence he has no control-for
example, where 250,000 shares have been tendered. The proxy given
in this case seems similar to the irrevocable proxy given the creditor
with whom stock is pledged. This creditor may vote the stock even
though the debt is not in default-and may never be in default.2 1 7  In
213 Compare Union Pac. R.R. v. Chicago & No. W. Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400 (N.D.
Ill. 1964), with Brown v. Chicago RI. & Pac. R.R., 328 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1964).
The proxy rules have recently been amended to permit management of a company
which has proposed a merger to its shareholders to reply to an intervening tender offer
before distributing the written proxy statement required by Rule 14a-3 of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act. This amendment was apparently designed to give management
the right immediately to reply to a tender offer which, if successful, could defeat the
proposed merger. Rule 14a-12, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7775 (Dec. 12, 1965).
214 If A is firmly obligated to purchase the shares, its position seems similar to
that of an after-record-date shareholder. It should be able to demand that the person
tendering the shares vote them as it directs or compel the execution of a proxy. See
Maidman, Voting Rights of After-Record-Date Shareholders: A Skeleton in a Wall
Street Closet, 71 YALE L.J. 1205 (1962).
215 See FREY, MoRRIS & CHoPER, CASES ON COR'ORATIONS 383 (1966).
216 See N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 609(f) (2) ; cf. Smith v. San Francisco & N.P.
Ry., 115 Cal. 584, 47 Pac. 582 (1897); Groub v. Blish, 88 Ind. App. 309, 152 N.E.
609 (1926).
217See Mobile & O.R.R. v. Nicholas, 98 Ala. 92, 12 So. 723 (1893); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 609(f) (3) ; cf. Abercrombie v. Davies, 35 Del. Ch. 599, 123 A.2d
893 (Ch. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 36 Del. Ch. 371, 130 A.2d 338 (Sup. Ct. 1957)
(irrevocable proxy given in connection with advance of funds to corporation enforced) ;
Ecclestone v. Indialantic, Inc., 319 Mich. 248, 29 N.W.2d 679 (1947) (irrevocable
proxy to creditor and officer of corporation) ; Deibler v. Chas. H. Elliott Co., 368
Pa. 267, 81 A.2d 557 (1951) (irrevocable proxy to vendor to insure payment of salary
to him for life). Compare DEs.. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 217 (1953) (circumscribing
pledgee's right to vote). Contra, ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-272 (1956) ("a vote
cast by a person holding stock as security is void").
1967]
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both cases, a person who is not the legal owner of stock has a sufficient
economic interest in the enterprise to justify letting him vote to protect
that interest. A is interested in purchasing B as it is and not as part of
a new enterprise. Since A will be obligated to buy the B shares
tendered if the conditions of the tender offer are met, it seems unfair to
permit the shares tendered to be voted against what A conceives to be
its interests.2 1 ' The most difficult case for finding a sufficient interest
to support the promise of irrevocability involves proxies given in con-
nection with those shares with respect to which A merely has an
option-but no obligation-to purchase. There is some authority-
albeit much less compelling reason-suggesting that A may be able
to vote these shares.
2 1 9
Even if A has sufficient interest in the B shares tendered to be
able to vote them under state law, the Commission staff seems to
take the position that proxies transmitted with tendered shares cannot
be voted until A is firmly obligated to purchase the shares. The Com-
mission's argument rests on the theory that, until A is firmly obligated
to purchase the shares, A is not "the beneficial owner" of the shares-
as that term is used in Rule 14a-2 (c) -and that the request for proxies
is, therefore, not exempt from the proxy rules. This argument suggests
that the form of irrevocable proxy requested should provide that the
proxy become effective only on the date A becomes firmly obligated
to buy the stock to which the proxy relates.' Even this technique does
not make the solicitation fit literally within the exemption provided in
Rule 14a-2(c) because the solicitation is made with respect to shares
of which A will become (rather than is) the beneficial owner. How-
ever, the Commission staff does not appear to be pressing this literal
construction. Because of these restrictions on the exercise of proxies,
A probably would find it expedient to provide in the tender offer that
its obligation to purchase is discharged if a material change-such as
a merger-occurs in B's business condition.
218 If A's obligation to purchase the shares tendered is discharged by a material
change in B's business condition-for example, as a consequence of a merger-the
justification for giving the vote to A largely disappears. See text accompanying note
220 infra.
2 1 9 Boyer v. Nesbitt, 227 Pa. 398, 76 At. 103 (1910) ; see Ringling v. Ringling
Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 29 Del. Ch. 318, 49 A.2d 603 (Ch.
1946), modified, 29 Del. Co. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (Sup. Ct 1947) (by implication), noted
in Comment, 15 U. Cxi. L. R:v. 738, 742 (1948). Contra, Stoelting Bros. Co. v.
Stoelting, 246 Wis. 109, 16 N.W2d 367 (1944); Bryne v. Morley, 78 Idaho 172,
299 P.2d 758 (1956) (dictum).
220 For an example of the use of this technique, see Letter of Transmittal, Form
of Tender for Shares of Common Stock of Allied Mills, Inc. (tender expiring Aug. 16,
1965) ("If and to the extent that the accompanying tender of shares of common
stock of Allied Mills, Inc. shall be accepted . . . the undersigned hereby irrevocably
constitutes and appoints . . . his/their attorneys and proxies").
